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CHAPTER IV

PROTECTIVE AGENCIES
A. INTRODUCTORY
Prisoners of war have always been, and continue to be, at the
complete mercy of the Detaining Power. The rules which have evolved
with respect to prisoners of war have uniformly had the objective of
affording them protection against the all-powerful Detaining Power;
but rules for the protection of prisoners of war are of value only
if there are methods of ensuring compliance therewith. 1 Over the
years a number of institutions have come into existence for the accomplishment of this purpose, including: (1) the Protecting Power;
(2) the prisoners' representative; (3) the International Committee
of the Red Cross; and (4) other international humanitarian organizations. While some of these institutions have other functions, a major
function of eacn, and the one which will concern us here, is to ensure
that the prisoners of war receive the full protection accorded to them
by the Convention. We shall endeavor to ascertain the nature of each
of these institutions, the powers that have been allocated to them, and
the manner in which those powers are exercised.
B. THE PROTECTING POWER!
1. Historical
The earliest indication of what we now term the Protecting Power
probably appeared in the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire of
1 We have already discussed the problem of compliance in the broad sense-the
acceptance of the applicability of the Convention generally in the international
armed conflict in which a Power is engaged. See pp. 26-34 supra. Here, we are
concerned with ensuring compliance with the specifics of the Convention.
2 A Protecting Power is a State which has accepted the responsibility of protecting the interests of a second State in the territory of a third, with which, for some
reason, such as war, the second State does not maintain diplomatic relations. 1973
Draft Additional Protocol, Article 2 (d), at 3; Article 2 (c), 1977 Protocol I; Siordet, Scrutiny 3. All three States must agree before the Prd.;ecting Power may
serve as such. Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 27-31, & 64; Draper, Implementation 46-47. In the terminology which we are using here, the second State
is the Power of Origin and the third State is the Detaining Power. If the Protecting Power is acting as such when no state of war exists, the State in whose territory it is acting is more properly called the Power of Residence. (After the breakoff' of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba in 1961, Switzerland acted as the Protecting Power for the United States in Cuba and Czechoslovakia acted as the Protecting Power for Cuba in ~he United States.)
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the sixteenth century.3 Curiously, in those early days protection of
nonnationals came about not as a result of agreements reached with
the Power of Residence by the Power of Origin, but as a result of
agreements reached with the Power of Residence by the prospective
Protecting Power itself-the latter having probably been primarily
concerned with the resulting increase in its own prestige and influence in the territory in which it was acting and in the home territories of the protected persons. At that period the Protecting Power
was, and in the three succeeding centuries it remained, completely
a creature of custom and usage, with no conventional basis, definition,
or functions. As a result, the extent of the activity of Protecting
Powers varied in different countries and even, with respect to different Protecting Powers, within the same country. The passage of time
resulted in the passing of the initiative for the designation of a Protecting Power in a particular case from the Protecting Power to the
Power of Origin, where it more properly belonged. It also resulted
in the concept of the Protecting Power as an international institution
becoming more and more firmly entrenched in customary international
law and practice. In its present form, however, the Protecting Power
dates back only one century-and its codified form is of even more
recent vintage.
Most writers attribute the modern genesis of the Protecting Power
to developments which occurred during the Franco-Prussian War
(1870-71). In that conflict, probably for the first time, all of the
belligerents were represented by Protecting Powers in the territory
of the enemy. Great Britain was charged with the protection of the
French in Germany; and the United States, Russia, and Switzerland
acted as Protecting Powers in France for the various German States.4
It may be said that the expansion of the functions of the Protecting
Power during this conflict was, in large measure, due to two practices
which originated during its course: that of expelling enemy consuls;
and that of imposing stringent restrictions on enemy aliens.1i Un3 Isolated instances of this practice had occurred earlier. Thus, for ex'ample, we
find that in the thirteenth century the Venetian Resident in Constantinople was
charged with the protection of Armenians and Jews. The appearance of the Protecting Power has been attributed to a combination of three older institutions of
international law: extraterritoriality; the employment of foreigners as diplomatic
and consular agents; and the use of personal good offices. Franklin, Protection
7-29. It is doubtful that the concept of the Protecting Power as it first appeared
in the Turkish Capitulations had any more direct progenitor.
4 Franklin, Protection 29 & 39. Eroglu, La repreesentation 10-12. Detailed information concerning the designation of Protecting Powers in most of the conflicts
mentioned herein may be found in this excellent study, at 10-29. (Concerning the
older institution of the "Prisoner-of-War Agent," see Article III of the Cartel for
the Exchange of Prisoners of War between Great Britain and the United States
(1813) and Basdevant, Deux conventions 5-6.)
5 Franklin, Protection 29.
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questionably, each of these practices could and did contribute to the
need for the enlargement of the functions of the Protecting Power.
The precedents established during the Franco-Prussian War were
adhered to in most subsequent international armed conflicts, many
of which had, however, their own peculiar aspects. Thus, in the SinoJapanese War (1894-95) each side requested the United States to act
as its Protecting Power, and so we find the same State acting as the
Protecting Power for each belligerent within the territory of the
other. o Similarly, Germany acted as the Protecting Power for both
belligerents in the ltalo-Turkish War (1911-12) and in the SinoSoviet War (1929). Going to the other extreme, in the Greco-Turkish
War (1897), Germany acted as the Protecting Power for Turkey in
Greece, while three other nations-England, France, and Russiaacted jointly for Greece in Turkey; in the Spanish-American War
(1898), England acted as the Protecting Power for the United States,
while France and Austria-Hungary acted jointly for Spain [it was
during this conflict that, for the first time recorded, a belligerent, (the
United States) specifically requested neutral inspection of installations within which prisoners of war were being held7 ] ; and during
the Balkan Wars (1912-13) France and Russia acted jointly as the
Protecting Power for Montenegro. This practice of using more than
one neutral State as a Protecting Power has since almost disappeared,
although at one time during World War II Spain was acting as the
Protecting Power for Japan in the continental United States, while
Sweden acted for her in Hawaii, and Switzerland in American
Samoa. 8
The Boer War (1899-1902) may, perhaps, be considered to have
been (at least to some extent) an exception to what was fast becoming a firmly established institution of international law. Early in that
conflict the British requested the United States to represent their interests with the Boers. Apparently the consent of the Boers was not
sought and they not only failed to designate a Protecting Power of
their own, but, for all practical purposes, at first refused to recognize
the right of the United States consular representatives to act on behalf of the British. Subsequently, the Boers did agree to permit the
United States consuls in their territory to perform certain specific
and limited functions with respect to British prisoners of war, upon
the understanding that United States consuls in Great Britain would,
and would be permitted to, perform similar functions with respect

o For the very interesting instructions issued by the United States to its Consul
in Peking, see [1894]1 For. Rel. U.S. 106-08 (1895).
7 Flory, Prisoners of War 107-08.
8 Franklin, Protection 164.
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to Boer prisoners of war held there. 9 Thus, to a limited degree, the
institution of the Protecting Power was recognized even in that conflict.
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) found the Protecting Powers
once again exercising the full powers which it had become customary
to assign them. Perhaps as a result of the favorable experiences of
the Sino-Japanese War, immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities
Japan requested the United States to act on its behalf in Russia; while
France was designated by Russia as its Protecting Power in Japan
and Korea. And once again, but to an even greater extent than during
the Spanish-American War, we find the representatives of the Protecting Powers concerning themselves with the welfare of prisoners of
war.l0
Thus it can readily be seen that when World War I burst upon
Europe, the designation of Protecting Powers by belligerents was a
firmly established international custom, although the Protecting Power as an institution had yet to be the subject of international legislation.l1 During the course of that conflict, four definite items of prog:ress occurred: first, public opinion in the belligerent nations achieved
an ability to understand how a friendly neutral could represent, at
times vigorously, an enemy belligerent and its nationals ;12 second, the
use of the Protecting Power as a means of safeguarding the welfare
of prisoners of war, although at first somewhat restricted, was later
greatly extended and received rather general acceptance ;13 third, the
Ibid., 68-70.
Eroglu, La representation 23-25; Franklin, Protection 78-19. The latter states
that on one occasion when an American Vice Consul was inspecting a prisoner-ofwar camp he was permitted to sample the meal which was then being given to
Japanese prisoners of war. In view of all these precedents, it is particularly difficult to comprehend why the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conferences, both of which were
sponsored by the Tsar of Russia, while codifying many customary rules concerning
the treatment of prisoners of war, continued the silence of previous international
conventions with respect to the institution of the Protecting Power.
11 Franklin, Protection 94-95. For the instructions issued by United States Secretary of State Bryan in August 1914, see 9 A.J.I.L Supp. 118 (1915); [1914]
For. Rei. U.S. Supp 740-41 (1928).
12 See Siordet, Scrutiny 7. World War I saw more men taken prisoner of war
than in any previous conflict; and it likewise saw them held in captivity for longer
periods of time. Both of these factors had the effect of focusing attention on prisoners of war. It was undoubtedly this situation which led to the more general
acceptance of the idea of a wider use of Protecting Powers in the interests of
prisoners of war. Pictet, Commentary 93-94.
1:1 Strangely, Germany, which had frequently acted as a Protecting Power, and
the United States, which had not only frequently acted as a Protecting Power, but
was probably the protagonist of the extension of the functions of the Protecting
Power with respect to prisoners of war prior to its own entry into World War I,
were the two most important belligerents to resist the activities of Protecting
Powers. At the beginning of that War, Germany instituted rigid restrictions on
9

10
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practice was adopted that when a neutral which had been acting as
a Protecting Power itself became embroiled in the conflict, a successor
Protecting Power would be designated to fill the vacuum;14 and, finally, the Protecting Power received legal recognition as an international institution in a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements
entered into by various of the belligerents during the course of the
hostilities in which, to a surprising extent, its functions were spelled
out with some degree of definitenessY'
The precedents established during World War I were destined to
bear fruit.lO A draft prisoner-of-war convention prepared in 1921 by
the rCRC, while contemplating the use of Protecting Powers for certain limited purposes, would have assigned to the rCRC the responsibility for establishing mobile commissions composed of neutrals
charged with assuring that the belligerents were complying with the
convention. This proposal was probably due to two factors: first, the
failure of the States which had acted as Protecting Powers during
World War I adequately to report their activities; and, second, the
belief that the duties involved in the effective protection of the rights
of prisoners of war exceeded the capacity of the diplomatic personnel
of the Protecting Powers.17 However, when the Diplomatic Conference convened in Geneva in 1929 and drafted the convention which
subsequently received the ratifications of the vast majority of States,
the rCRC proposal was not adopted; instead, the basic prjnciple of
the Protecting Power received general acceptance, the former Protecting Powers taking the position that all that was needed to assure
their activities was that their role "should be distinctly set out, and
their task clearly defined."18 The 1929 Prisoner-of-War Convention
visits by neutrals to its prisoner-of-war camps. By 1916 these restrictions had,
due largely to the efforts of the United States, for the most part disappeared. Yet
when the United States became a belligerent in 1917, the United States Secretary
of War took the position that Germany had no right to designate the Swiss to inspect American prisoner-of-war camps unless under treaty law. Flory, Prisoners
of War 108-09. His position was apparently overruled by President Wilson and
the Swiss were permitted to make such inspections.
14 Eroglu, La representation 27-28.
IG All of the bilateral and multilateral agreements cited in note I-39 supra had
references to the Protecting Power. The 1918 Agreement between the United
States and Germany cited therein referred to the Protecting Power in no less than
25 separate articles.
16 Franklin, Protection 99-100, states, or perhaps somewhat overstates, that a
plan for the operations of the Protecting Power proposed by the still-neutral
United States in 1915, and accepted by the British and German Governments with
broadening modifications, "gained world-wide recognition and paved the way which
led to the prisoner of war convention signed ... at Geneva on July 27, 1929."
17 R!'smussen, Code des prisonniers de guerre 56.
18 Siordet, Scrutiny 12. Twenty years and one World War later, we again find
them urging that the Protecting Power be given the benefit of "well-defined and
precise provisions." 2B Final Record 19.
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thus became the first international agreement negotiated in time of
peace to give official recognition to the institution of the Protecting
Power.19 However, it did not create a new international concept. It
did not make the use of the Protecting Power by belligerents obligatory. It did not affect the relationships which had previously existed
between the Power of Origin, the Protecting Power, and the Detaining Power. It did give the relationship a formal and agreed status
which it had not previously had. 20 It may well be considered that the
provisions of the 1929 Convention relating to Protecting Powers constituted the most important advance contained in that Convention over
the provisions relating to prisoners of war contained in the 1907
Hague Regulations. The lessons learned during World War I had not
been forgotten.
The advent of World War II provided, all too soon, an opportunity
for the implementation and testing of this novel international legislation. Most of the belligerents were represented by Protecting Powers
and, in general, these found the provisions of the 1929 Convention
relating to their activities extremely helpful, even if not as all-inclusive as they might have preferred. True, the designation and functioning of Protecting Powers on behalf of prisoners of war had
previously become an almost universally accepted custom of the
international law of war. But it is necessary to bear in mind that,
despite this, in the Soviet Union and in Japan, neither of which
nations was a party to the 1929 Convention, there was either complete
or substantial failure in the functioning of the Protecting Powers.!!1
19 Seitz, La Suisse 34.
20

Franklin, Protection 115; Janner, Puissance protectrice 49.

!!1 The Soviet Union took the position that as it was a Party to the Fourth Hague
Convention of 1907, the Regulations annexed to which, it asserted, covered "all the
main questions of the regime of captivity" (but not the question of the Protecting
Power, see note 10 supra), there was no need for it to consider an Italian proposal
to apply reciprocally the provisions of the 1929 Convention (1 ICRC Report 412).
While Japan stated its intention to "apply this Convention mutatis mutandis, to
all prisoners of war" (ibid., 443), the Protecting Powers were never permitted to
function in Japan in a manner even remotely resembling their manner of functioning in the territories and, particularly, the occupied territories of most of the
other belligerents. I.M.T.F.E. 1127-36; Franklin, Protection 129-34. As a result
of the foregoing, and of the disappearance of many Powers of Origin during the
course of the hostilities, the ICRC has estimated that during World War II approximately 70 percent of all prisoners of war were deprived of the services of a
Protecting Power. 2B Final Record 21; de La Pradelle, Nouvelles conventions 226.
Thus, Germany denied the status of States to Poland, Yugoslavia, France, and
Belgium (after the 1940 armistice agreements), Free France and Italy (after
Mussolini's overthrow in 1943), and refused to permit the intervention of Protecting Powers on behalf of their captured personnel. Pictet, Recueil 87-88. After
World War II ended, the Swiss made a detailed report of their manifold activities
as a Protecting Power. Seitz, La Suisse 34.
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In general, the fact that such a large number of countries were
parties to the World War II hostilities had two distinct but related
results. In the first place, not only did the absence of strong neutrals
present a problem in the selection of Protecting Powers, but it also
meant that there was no large neutral world public opinion to be
affected by violations of the Convention; and, in the second place,
because of the small number of neutrals available to act as Protecting
Powers, it frequently occurred that the same neutral was designated
to act as the Protecting Power for two opposing belligerents.
Once again wartime lessons were not forgotten and, just four years
later, the 1949 Prisoner-of-War Convention was signed in which, as
we shall see, the functions of the Protecting Power are identified and
defined with far greater particularity than had been the case in the
1929 Convention.22 Unfortunately, in not one of the numerous instances of international armed conflict& which have occurred since 1949
has the institution of the Protecting Power been utilized. 23
From the foregoing brief historical survey, it is apparent that prior
to 1870 only the precursors of the modern Protecting Power existed,
and not the latter itself; that during the period from 1870 to 1914
the concept of the use of the Protecting Power began to take form,
particularly with respect to the problem of the prisoner of war; and
that. during the period subsequent to 1914, the form has become
definite, the institution of the Protecting Power having become the
subject of numerous bilateral and multilateral international agreements, culminating in the 1949 Convention to which most of the nations of the world are parties. 24 It now becomes appropriate to an-

22 References to the Protecting Power are contained in 36 of its 132 substantive
articles, as well as in two of its Annexes.
23 U.N., Human Rights, A/7720, sec. 213. But see Pictet, Humanitarian Law 66
and note 29 infra. In Korea and in Vietnam the ICRC performed the humanitarian
functions of the Protecting Power on one side (in South Korea and in South Vietnam) but was not allowed to do so on the other. In the Indo-Pakistani Wars (1965
and 1971), the Middle East Wars (1967 and 1973), and the Honduran-Salvador
Conflict (1969), the ICRC performed these functions on both sides. (In the IndiaPortugal War (1961) a Protecting Power already existed becaus~ of a prior break
in diplomatic relations.)
24 See Appendix B. The use of the institution of the Protecting Power has since
been resorted to in Article 21 of the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, where it is adopted as a means
of overseeing the protection of inanimate objects-which is, actually, merely a
variation of the protection furnished historically by a Protecting Power, a very
large part of its energy having once been directed toward the protection of the
embassy buildings and diplomatic archives of the Protected Power. See also,
Articles 45 and 46 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
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alyze the form and the character which the Protecting Power received
during this evolutionary process. 25
2. The Modern Concept of the Protecting Power
a. DESIGNATION
Article 86 of the 1929 Convention was, to say the least, somewhat
vaguely worded:
The High Contracting Parties recognize that the regular application of the present Convention will find a guaranty in the
possibility of collaboration of the protecting Powers charged
with safeguarding the interests of belligerents. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
There is nothing mandatory here. There is no requirement here that
a Protecting Power actually be designated or that, if designated, it
be permitted to function as such by the Detaining Power. The comparable provision of the 1949 Convention reads quite differently.
Article 8 (1) of the latter Convention reads:
The present Convention shall be applied with the cooperation
and under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty
it is to safeguard the interests of the Parties to the conflict. . . .
(Emphasis added.)26
It would appear that it was intended that the designation of Protecting Powers become at least a moral obligation of the belligerents;
and that, once designated, a Protecting Power has a duty not only to
the Power of Origin27 but also to the other parties to the conflict,
25 As was aptly stated by one author: "What happened was that an existing
usage was taken, and transformed into a regulation. It was the organ which
created the function." Siordet, Scrutiny 3.
26 This provision has been termed "the keystone" of the 1949 Convention. Yingling & Ginnane 397. In the British Manual para. 276, the Protecting Power is
termed "the principal organ, apart from the Contracting Parties themselves, for
ensuring the observance of the execution of the Convention." It is therefore indeed
distressing to find that while Soviet International Law states (at 421) that "citizens of a belligerent who remain on enemy territory are under the protection of
some neutral country," nowhere in the comparatively detailed discussion of the
1949 Prisoner-of-War Convention (at 431-34) is there even any passing reference
to such a right of protection for prisoners of war or to the provisions of the Convention relating to Protecting Powers.
21 It must be borne in mind that a Protecting Power is not a general agent of
the Power of Origin. One author has defined the overall relationship between these
two Powers as follows: "The protecting Power does not act in its own name but
rather as a kind of caretaker or intermediary. Nevertheless, it acts independently
in so far as the State whose interest it protects cannot demand, but only request,
it to perform certain services, and the protecting Power itself decides the way in
which it discharges its mission. Nor maya belligerent give instructions to those
organs of the protecting Power which carry out this mission. Instead, requests to
the protecting Power have to be made through diplomatic channels. The protecting
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to perform the functions which have been assigned to it by the Convention. 28 But if it was the intention of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference to make the designation of Protecting Powers mandatory in
international armed conflicts, the Convention has been totally unsuccessful in accomplishing that purpose; for, as has been mentioned,
there has not been a single Protecting Power designated pursuant
to Article 8 since the Convention was drafted and entered into effect
-and there has certainly been no lack of international armed conflict during that period. The importance of this failure cannot be overestimated. 20
The lCRC has identified three major reasons why the institution
of the Protecting Power has not been utilized in the international
armed conflicts which have taken place since the Convention became
effective:
(1) The designation of a Protecting Power might be interpreted as the recognition of the enemy belligerent;
(2) Despite the armed conflict, diplomatic relations were not
broken off by the belligerents;
(3) The existence of a general reluctance, because of the provisions of Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, to
admit the existence of and participation in international armed
conflict.30
It is possible to draft provisions which would effectively eliminate
the first two bases for failing to designate a Protecting Power. It
would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to draft a provision
which would eliminate the third reason.
Power may refuse to act when compliance with a request would be contrary to its
own interests or infringe the lawful right of the enemy State." Castren 92. See
also, Franklin, Protection 114.
28 Siordet has stated that the designation of a Protecting Power is no longer
optional but is now "almost obligatory"; that it is now put in the "imperative
form"; and that in performing its mission the Protecting Power is no longer the
special representative of one of the parties, but is "the representative of all the
Contracting Parties to the Convention." Siordet, Scrutiny 36. See also, 1971 GE
Documentation, II, at 11-12.
2fJ In Pictet, Humanitarian Law 66, the statement is made that Protecting
Powers have been designated in three instances since World War II: Suez (1956) ;
Goa (1961); and Bangladesh (1971). Forsythe, Who Guards the Guardians 46-47
accepts that statement in its entirety. However, it is subject to major qualifications; in fact, it is arguable that none of these three instances can really be said
to constitute the designation of a Protecting Power pursuant to Article 8 of the
1949 Convention.
One of the leading military-academic scholars in this field has said: "To talk of
the regular application of international humanitarian law without the effective
functioning of some Protecting Power system ••. is idle chatter!' Draper, Implementation 47. Elsewhere the same author has said that "the Geneva Conventions
of 1949 are virtually inoperative without the active role and participation of the
Protecting Power system!' Ibid., 46.
30 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 16-17. For a lengthier list of reasons, see Abi-
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The future is far from bright with respect to the overall solution
of this problem, and this has received wide recognition. Area specialists are able to find little or no evidence that any Communist country
-given the "spy-phobia" complexes with which all are afHictedwill ever allow a Protecting Power to function in its territory,31 no
matter how the provisions of the Convention relating to the designation of Protecting Powers are strengthened and clearly made mandatory. Some time ago the United Nations General Assembly, after
shying away from the subject for many years, officially recognized
the prior lack of, and the future need for, recourse to the institution
of the Protecting Power. 32 Innumerable private international organizations have sought a solution to the problem. 33 At the very initiation of its proposal to review the need for the reaffirmation and
development of international humanitarian law applicable in armed
conflicts, the ICRC emphasized the problem in this area,34 and the
Conference of Government Experts convened by the ICRC in 1971
discussed the subject at great length. 35 The ICRC attempted to draft
a provision which would not only make the designation of a Protecting
Power practically mandatory, but would also eliminate several of the
reasons, enumerated above, for the past failures to designate Protecting Powers.36 The 1972 Conference of Government Experts once
again discussed the matter at length,37 this time in the context of the
ICRC proposal and of the many substitute and amendatory proposals

Saab, Le renforcement du systeme du droit humanitaire, XII/2 Revue de droit
penal militaire et de droit de la guel're 227-28.
31 Miller, The Law of War 224, 241-42, & 254. These conclusions are undoubtedly
based at least in part on the actions of the Soviet Union during World War II; the
events in Korea (1950-53); the Sino-Indian War (1962); and Vietnam (c. 196573). Nevertheless, in commenting on the proposals contained in U.N., Human
Rights, A/8052, Ch. XI, concerning the possibility of new machinery to replace
the Protecting Power, the Soviet Union said that "it must be stated that existing
institutions should be used to supervise the application of humanitarian rules in
armed conflict." U.N., Human Rights, A/8313, at 68. The cynic might interpret
this to mean that the Soviet Union prefers a moribund, inoperative Protecting
Power rather than a new, vital, mandatory institution, created for the purpose of
ensuring that belligerents will apply, and will comply with, the provisions of the
Convention.
32 G.A. Res. 2852, 20 December 1971, Respect for human rights in armed conflicts, 26 GAOR, Supp. 29, at 90, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1972). See also U.N., Human
Rights, A/7720, § 213.
33 See 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 22. See also 1972 I.L.A. Rep. 305, 308;
U.N., Human Rights, A/8370, § 165.
34 1969 Reaffirmation 87-91; 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 10-34.
35 1971 GE Rep:>rt, paras. 532-51.
3111972 Busic Te .•·ts 6; 1972 Commentary 14-19.
37 1972 GE Report, I, at paras. 4.56-4.58, & 5.24.
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that had been submitted by the experts of the various nations.3s Out
of this discussion emerged a new proposal that was submitted to the
Diplomatic Conference.30
Article 5 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol relating to international armed conflicts contained six paragraphs, the first five of
which are relevant to the problem under discussion. Paragraph 1
provided that from the outset of international armed conflict, as specified in Article 2 of the 1949 Convention, each belligerent "shall
without delay designate a Protecting Power . . . and . . . permit the
activities of a Protecting Power designated by the adverse Party
and accepted as such." Obviously, this was merely an iteration of a
fundamental, customary rule of international law and no real solution
to the problem. True, the belligerents were being told in grammatically
authoritative language (shall) that they were to make use of and to
permit the enemy to make use of the Protecting Power; but once again
there would be no automatic remedy for the situation created where
a belligerent disregarded, or even affirmatively refused to comply
with, the requirements of the paragraph.40
In paragraph 2 an attempt was made to solve the foregoing problem. It provided that where there was "disagreement or unjustified
delay" in the designation of Protecting Powers, the ICRC "shall offer
its good offices"-not to perform the functions of the Protecting Powers but merely to assist in their selection: it was therein authorized
to ask each belligerent for "a list of at least five States which they
3S Ibid., II, 97-104 passim. 'For a discussion of the proposal in this regard made
by the U.S. experts, see Baxter, Perspective: the Evolving Law of Armed Conflicts. 60 Mil. L. Rev. 99, 109-10 (1973).
3D Article 5 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol; and 1973 Commentary 11-14.
That Article was discussed, amended, and adopte!I by Committee I of the 1975
Diplomatic Conference. 1975 Report of Committee I, at 10-17; The Committee's
proposal was adopted in toto by the Diplomatic Conference with only minor edit-'
orial changes.
40 The 1973 Conference of Government Experts had discussed the possibility of
a procedure for the automatic designation of Protecting Powers but had decided
against it. 1973 Commentary 12. The provisions actually adopted by the Diplomatic
Conference as Article 5 (1) and (2) of the 1977 Protocol I read:
Article 5-Appointment of Protecting Powers and of their substitute
1. It is the duty of the Parties to a conflict from the beginning of that conflict to secure the supervision and implementation of the Conventions and of
this Protocol by the application of the system of Protecting Powers, including
inter alia the designation and acceptance of those Powers, in accordance with
the following paragraphs. Protecting Powers shall have the duty of safeguarding the interests of the Parties to the conflict.
2. From the beginning of a situation referred to in Article 1, each Party to
the conflict shall without delay designate a Protecting Power for the purpose
of applying the Conventions and this Protocol and shall, likewise without
delay and for the same purpose, permit the activities of a Protecting Power
which has been accepted by it as such after designation by the adverse Party.

consider acceptable" ;41 the lists "shall be communicated" within 10
days; and if any State is on both lists, the ICRC is to seek its agreement.42 And paragraph 3 included alternative proposals for the consideration of the Diplomatic Conference as to the procedure to be
followed if, despite the provisions of paragraph 2, no Protecting
Powers were designated: (1) the ICRC could offer to assume the
functions of a substitute for the Protecting Powers if the adverse
belligerents agreed "and insofar as those functions are compatible
with its own activities"; or (2) the belligerents "shall accept" the
offer of the ICRC to act as a substitute for the Protecting Powers.43
The first alternative still made it possible for a belligerent to prevent
the ultimate designation of a Protecting Power or a substitute for a
Protecting Power; the second alternative made it mandatory that the
offer of the ICRC be accepted by the belligerents.
41 It was not clear whether a belligerent would be suggesting States which it
desired to have act as a Protecting Power on its behalf, or which it would be willing to accept on its territory as a Protecting Power for the adverse Party, or both.
However, this has been clarified in Article 5 {3} of the 1977 Protocol!. See note 42
infra.
42Presumably, the inclusion of the name of a State on the two lists would mean
that it was acceptable to both belligerents and only its consent would then be
needed for the trilateral agreement that is required. See note 2 supra, and note 50
infra. The provision actually adopted by the Diplomatic Conference as Article 5 {3}
reads:
3. If a Protecting Power has not been designated or accepted from the beginning of a situation referred to in Article 1, the International Committee of
the Red Cross, without prejudice to the right of any other impartial humanitarian organization to do likewise, shall offer its good offices to the Parties to
the conflict with a view to the designation without delay of a Protecting Power
to which the Parties to the conflict consent. For that purpose it may, inter alia,
ask each Party to provide it with a list of at least five States which that Party
considers acceptable to act as Protecting Power on its behalf in relation to an
adverse Party, and ask each adverse Party to provide a list of at least five
States which it would accept as the Protecting Power of the first Party; these
lists shall be communicated to the Committee within two weeks after the receipt of the request; it shall compare them and seek the agreement of any
proposed State named on both lists.
{The ICRC is not instructed as to what action it is to take if, by chance, more
than one State is named on both lists!}
43 The ICRC had previously announced that it had decided that all of the functions of the Protecting Power were humanitarian in nature and that they could,
therefore, be performed by that organization. 1972 GE Report, I, para. 4.71 {at
ISO}. See also, ibid., 208; and 1971 GE Report, paras. 553-54. The major controversy in Committee I revolved around the choice between the two alternatives proposed, as well as many suggested variations thereof. Article 5 {4} of the 1977
Protocol I, as approved by the Diplomatic Conference, reads:
4. If, despite the foregoing, there is no Protecting Power, the Parties to the
conflict shall accept without delay an offer which may be made by the International Committee of the Red Cross or by any other organization which offers
all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy, after due consultations with the
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Paragraph 4 was an attempt to eliminate one of the reasons sometimes advanced by belligerents as justification for their failure to
utilize the institution of the Protecting Power in international armed
conflict-the fear that this action would be interpreted as a recognition of the enemy belligerent.44 It very specifically stated that the
designation and acceptance of Protecting Powers "shall not affect the
legal status of the Parties to the conflict or that of the territories
over which they exercise authority."45 And paragraph 5 was an attempt to eliminate another of the reasons that had previously been
advanced by belligerents as justification for their failure to utilize
the institution of the Protecting Power in international armed conflict-that diplomatic relations had not been broken off by the belligerents. 41l It provided in relevant part that "[t]he maintenance of diplomatic relations ... does not constitute an obstacle to the appointment of Protecting Powers . . . ."47 Experience has demonstrated
that even though diplomatic relations have not broken off, an enemy
said Parties and taking into account the result of these consultations, to act
as a sUbstitute. The functioning of such a substitute is subject to the consent
of the Parties to the conflict; every effort shall be made by the Parties to the
conflict to facilitate the operation of the substitute in the performance of its
tasks under the Conventions and this Protocol.
Concerning the "any other organizations" referred to above, see pp. 312-314 infra.
44 The several Middle East conflicts (1956, 1967, 1973) presented this problem.
Pilloud, Reservations 8.
45 See also Article 4 of the 1977 Protocol 1. A provision to the same general
effect may be found in Article 3 (4) of the 1949 Convention, dealing with noninternational armed conflicts, and for the same reason. Article 5(5) of the 1977 Protocol I as approved by the 1975 Diplomatic Conference reads:
5. In accordance with article 4, the designation and acceptance of Protecting Powers for the purpose of applying the Conventions and the Protocol shall
not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict or of any territory, including occupied territory.
46 The major international armed conflict in which diplomatic relations were
not broken off and in which this problem arose was the Sino-Indian War (1962).
See Cohen & Chiu, People's China 1570-71; Cohen & Leng, The Sino-Indian Dispute 298-300; Draper, Implementation 46.
47 Article 5 (6) as adopted by the Committee I of the 1975 Diplomatic Conference was the proposed Article 5 (5) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol with an
addition which should make it even more difficult for a belligerent to use the existence of diplomatic relations as an excuse for failing to cooperate in the designation
of Protecting Powers. Article 5 (6) of the 1977 Protocol I, as approved by the Diplomatic Conference reads:
6. The maintenance of diplomatic relations between Parties to the conflict
or the entrusting of the protection of a Party's interests and those of its nationals to a third State in accordance with the rules of international law relating to diplomatic relations is no obstacle to the designation of Protecting
Powers for the purpose of applying the Conventions and this Protocol.
(For a discussion in depth of the activities of the 1975 session of the Diplomatic
Conference with respect to Article 5 of what became the 1977 Protocol I, see Forsythe, Who Guards the Guardians.)
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Embassy cannot function for the protection of its nationals, particularly prisoners of war, to an extent even remotely equivalent to a
neutral State acting as a Protecting Power. 48
What are the qualifications required for designation as a Protecting
Power? It must, first of all, be a State within the meaning of that
term in international law. It must also, of course, be a neutral State
-and it is advisable that it be one which can reasonably be expected
to remain neutral, although this latter qualification has become more
and more difficult to assure. And, finally, it must be a State which
maintains diplomatic relations with both the requesting State (the
Power of Origin) and the State in the territory of which it is being
requested to operate (the Detaining Power).
How'does a State actually become a Protecting Power? The belligerent State desiring the services of a Protecting Power (the Power
of Origin) requests a neutral State which has the qualifications listed
above to act on its behalf vis-a.-vis a specific enemy belligerent. If the
neutral State is willing to assume the functions of a Protecting Power, it so notifies the requesting State. It must then obtain the concurrence of the enemy belligerent in whose territory it has been requested
to function (the Detaining Power) .49 In other words, the actual designation of the Protecting Power is based upon the request of the
Power of Origin and the consent of both the proposed Protecting
Power and the Detaining Power. 50
48 Cohen & Leng, The Sino-Indian Dispute 278 & 320; Draper, People's Republic
367; 1971 GE Report, para. 538. This does not apply to neutrals or cobelligerents
and Article 4 (2) of the Fourth Convention provides that nationals of such Powers
are not protected persons while diplomatic relations are maintained. There is no
such provision with respect to nationals of enemy Powers. In the Third Convention
the sole reference to the effect of the continuance of diplomatic relations is in that
portion of Article 4B (2) which is concerned with members of the armed forces of
belligerents in the territory of neutral or "non-belligerent" Powers. This is indicative of the fact that the 1949 Diplomatic Conference did not intend that the continuing presence of enemy diplomatic personnel in the territory of a belligerent
should nullify the provisions of the Convention concerning Protecting Powers. The
1972 Conference of Government Experts apparently felt quite strongly about this.
1973 Commentary 164; 1972 GE Report, I, paras. 4.56-4.79.
49 Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 74. This is the step that the United States
apparently failed to take when it was requested to perform the functions of the
Protecting Power by Great Britain during the Boer War (1899-1902), See p. 257

supra:
50 The 1949 Convention contains no provisions with respect to the method of designating a Protecting Power, the required qualifications for a Protecting Power,
etc., leaving these problems to be governed by the relevant rules of customary in.ternational law. Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 62 & 224. The 1973 Draft
Additional Protocol proposed, in Article 2 (d), to define the term "Protecting
Power" as meaning "a State not engaged in the conflict, which, designated by a
Party to the conflict and accepted by the adverse Party, is prepared to carry out
the functions assigned to a Protecting Power under the Conventions and the pres-
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As we have seen, it has frequently occurred in the past that more
than one State has been designated as the Protecting Power for a
belligerent. 51 There is nothing in the 1949 Convention, nor in general
international law, to preclude this practice. However, the advantages
of the other extreme-one and the same Protecting Power for opposing belligerents-are many. Even a small nation, when acting as the
Protecting Power for both sides, is in a unique position to obtain a
general observance of the law of war by each belligerent on the basis
of reciprocity. This was made quite apparent during World War II,
when Switzerland acted as the Protecting Power for many of the
belligerents on both sides of that conflict. 52 The limited number of
States that would be available and competent to act as Protecting
Powers in any future maj or international armed conflict might once
again bring about this result. 53
b. SUBSTITUTES FOR PROTECTING POWERS
In the light of events of World War II, the delegates at the 1949
Diplomatic Conference could not but foresee the possibility of situations in which there would be no Protecting Power fo stand between
the Detaining Power and the prisoner of war.54 They attempted to
ent Protocol." This provision, with some useful editing, was eventually approved
by the Diplomatic Conference as Article 2(c) of the 1977 Protocol!' It reads:
(c) "Protecting Power" means a neutral or other State not a Party to the
conflict which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by
the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to a
Protecting Power under the Conventions and this Protocol.
lil See pp. 256-257 supra.
52 Pictet, Commentaru 95-96. The same conclusion was reached in Franklin,
Protection 164-65, where this statement appears: "For uniformity and simplicity
of administration it is obviously desirable for the protected power [Power of
Origin] to entrust its interests in another country to only one protecting power,
and in instances involving the protection of belligerent interests there are advantages to all concerned if both belligerents entrust their interests in the other's
territory to the same protecting power•... The experience of World War II indicates that a more uniform administration and a higher standard of treatment of
enemy interests by both belligerents result from a reciprocal protection of the interests of those belligerents by the same protecting power throughout the territories under the control of each belligerent." In 1945 Switzerland alone represented 35
belligerents, and in many cases it represented both of opposing belligerents in the
territory of the other. Janner, Puissance protectrice 24 and Annexe I, at 68-70.
(Eroglu, La representation, Annexe III, at 144-48, lists only 34, but he omits
Yugoslavia. )
53 One author has suggested the possibility that in a future international armed
conflict the demand for Protecting Powers may exceed the supply available. De La
Pradelle, Nouvelles conventions 225. Of course, since that was written the number
of States in the world community has more than doubled and many of these new
SOVereign entities would probably be available to act, and would be fully capable of
acting, as Protecting Powers.
54 For some of these possible situations see Siordet, Scrutiny 48-53; and Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 229-36.
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solve this problem, in all its varied facets, by providing in Article 10
of the Convention a number of methods for the designation of "substitutes" for Protecting Powers. 55 It must, however, be emphasized
that the provisions of this Article should not be considered as affecting the basic method of selecting either the original Protecting Power
or successor Protecting Powers as long as the Power of Origin continues to exist and to be able to function in its sovereign capacity.
A successor Protecting Power, necessitated, perhaps, because the original Protecting Power has become a belligerent, is not a "substitute"
for a Protecting Power within the meaning of Article 10, and its
designation is governed by the same rules of customary international
law as those which govern the designation of the original Protecting
Power. 56 It must also be noted that a State or organization designated
under the provisions of Article 10 is not a "Protecting Power" as that
term is used generally in international law and as it is used elsewhere in the Convention, but is merely a State or organization performing some or all of the functions allocated to Protecting Powers
by the various relevant provisions of the Convention. 57
55 A substitute for the Protecting Power exercises all of the powers and performs all of the functions of a Protecting Power. See Article 10 (6). Concerning
the French proposal for an ongoing international organization to serve as the substitute for the Protecting Power and the 1949 Diplomatic Conference's decision to
refer it to the governments by resolution, see p. 18 supra. The Soviet Union
opposed both the French proposal and the adoption of the resolution, stating as to
the latter that it "sees no need to consider this question or to create such a body,
since the problem of the Protecting Powers has been satisfactorily solved by the
Conventions established at the present Conference." Declaration made by the Delegation of the Soviet Union at the time of the signing of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1 Final Record, 201. The validity of that statement is considerably reduced
by the fact that both the French proposal and the resolution pertained to substitutes for Protecting Powers under Article 10-and the Soviet Union made a
reservation to that Article. See text, pp. 273-274 infra.
5S Pictet, Commentary 117-18. Thus, when Spain 'vithdrew as the Protecting
Power for Japan in the continental United States on 30 March 1945, the Japanese
Government requested Switzerland to act in that capacity, Switzerland agreed to
do so, the United States gave its concurrence and, effective 21 July 1945, Switzerland assumed the functions of Protecting Power for Japan in the United States.
Rich, Brief History 488. In this case Switzerland was a Protecting Power as successor to Spain; it was not a substitute for a Protecting Power.
57 Article 2 (e) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol defined a "substitute" as
"an organization acting in place of a Protecting Power for the discharge of all or
part of its functions." 1973 Draft Additional Protocol 3. As adopted by Committee
I and as approved by the Diplomatic Conference as Article 2(d) of the 1977 Protocol I, this provision now reads:
(d) "substitute" means an organization acting in place of a Protecting
Power in accordance with Article 5.
Article 5 (6) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol stated that whenever mention
was made therein of a Protecting Power, this "also implies the substitute within
the meaning of Article 2 (e)." 1973 Draft Additional Protocol 4. (This latter pro-
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The first paragraph of Article 10 authorizes the High Contracting
Parties to agree "to entrust to an organization which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers." It is on the basis of the foregoing that a legal
foundation already exists for the various international organizations
which have been proposed as substitutes for Protecting Powers ;58
and it is here that the ICRC's recently expressed willingness to assume
the functions of a substitute for a Protecting Power50 would be implemented. Moreover, if this provision and the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 10, discussed immediately below, fail to produce
a substitute for a Protecting Power, then under the third paragraph
of Article 10 the Detaining Power "shall request or shall accept" the
services of a humanitarian organization such as the ICRC to assume
the humanitarian functions of the Protecting P ower. 60
The second paragraph of Article 10 contains the controversial provisions with respect to substitutes for Protecting Powers. It provides,
in substance, that where, "no matter for what reason" (emphasis
added), there is no Protecting Power (designated under Article 8)
vision is substantially the same as Article 10, paragraph 6, of the 1949 Convention). With some minor editing Article 5 (6) of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol
was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference as Article 5 (7) of the 1977 Protocol I.
58 The French proposal, incorporated into Resolution 2 of the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference, was an early example of such an organization. See note 55 supra. See
also U.N., HU'TIULn Rights, A/7720, §§ 224-25; ibid., A/8052, paras. 245-50; 1971
GE Report, §§ 540-48; 1972 Commentary 25-26. One of the major functions of the
new international entity proposed by the present author (see pP. 19-20 supra)
would be as an automatic substitute for a Protecting Power. See Levie ,Working
Paper 11-14. (The "International Fact-Finding Commission" created by Article 90
of the 1977 Protocol I does not have this function.) At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the ICRC representative indicated that the first paragraph of Article 10
contemplated an agreement entered into in peacetime entrusting the functions of
the Protecting Power to a named organization. 2B Final Record 61. While this is
certainly a possibility, and is the basis for the prollosals herein referred to, there
is no reason why it could not also be implemented by the belligerents in wartime.
50 See note 43 supra. This expressed willingness on the part of the ICRC to act
as a substitute for a Protecting Power was a complete reversal of policy. At the
1949 Diplomatic Conference the ICRC representative had stated that the ICRC
"could on no account be taken into consideration" to act as the organization contemplated by the first paragraph of Article 10. 2B Final Record 61.
60 It is here that the ICRC felt that it belonged when the statement quoted in
note 59 supra was made. 2B Final ReCjjrd 63; Pictet, Commentary 119. However,
inasmuch as it has now determined (!nd properly so) that all of the functions
of a Protecting Power are humanitarian in nature (see note 43 supra), the difference between "the duties incumbent on the Protecting Powers," contained in the
first paragraph of Article 10, and "the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers," contained in the third paragraph of Article 10, has, for all practical purposes, disappeared. It must be borne in mind, however, that while the
first paragraph of Article 10 requires the agreement of the Detaining Power and
the Power of Origin, action under the third paragraph of Article 10 may be taken
by the Detaining Power acting alone. Heckenroth, Puissance protectrices 263-65.
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and no organization entrusted with the duties of the Protecting Power
(pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 10), "the Detaining Power
shall request a neutral State, or such an organization" to undertake
to perform the functions assigned to the Protecting Powers by the
Convention. On the surface this appears to be just one more effort
to ensure the existence of a Protecting Power or of a substitute for a
Protecting Power in the absence of an actual Protecting Power. The
dispute which has arisen may be ascribed to the inclusion of the clause
"no matter for what reason." This appears to give to the Detaining
Power, acting alone, carte blanche to select a neutral State or an organization "which offers all guarantees of impartiality and efficacy" to
perform the duties of a Protecting Power whenever for the moment
there is no Protecting Power in being. This clause, and the entire
paragraph, has been interpreted by some commentators as being limited in its application to instances in which the Power of Origin
"intentionally abstains, or systematically refuses, to appoint a Protecting Power, or again, if it disappears entirely."61 However, it can
be argued just as strongly, and possibly with more legal justification,
that "no matter for what reason" means exactly what it says. The
Soviet and other delegates at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference objected
to the quoted clause in that they believed that the right of the Detaining Power to act unilaterally in the selection of a substitute for a
Protecting Power for the Power of Origin should be limited to situations in which the Power of Origin had ceased to exist. 62 There is
much merit to the argument. Where the Power of Origin continues to
exist, no valid reason can be discerned for discarding the established
and customary procedure for the selection of either the original Protecting Power or of a successor Protecting Power.
It is true that there might be instances in which the Power of Origin
fails to designate a Protecting Power-but that should not create a
right in the Detaining Power to designate a substitute for the Protecting Power. Such a failure by the Power of Origin would in no
manner affect the right of the Detaining Power, in its capacity as a
Power of Origin, to designate a Protecting Power to act on its behalf
in its enemy's territory. The Power of Origin that does arbitrarily
refuse to designate a Protecting Power to act on its behalf may believe
that it has good reasons for so doing-and it should not be told that if
it does not take specific action to Pfovide protection for the captured
members of its armed forces, its 'enemy, the Detaining Power, will
have the right to do so.
61 1971 GE Documentation, II at 13; accord, Knitel, Less Delegations du Comite
International de la Croix-Rouge 88. Even in his attempt to justify the provisions
of the second paragraph of Article 10, Siordet concedes that the provision is not
"clear." Siordet, Scrutiny 59-60.
62 2B Final Record 29, 347, & 351.
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The major objection to the procedure contemplated by paragraph
two of Article 10 is that situations may arise in which, through no
fault of the Power of Origin, it has no Protecting Power, and, before
it can take action to remedy this deficiency, the Detaining Power
exercises its power under the second paragraph of Article 10, designating a weak and friendly "neutral" State as a substitute for a Protecting Power, and then refusing to concur in the designation of a
true Protecting Power by the Power of Origin on the ground that
there is no need for such a designation. To accomplish this it might
refuse to concur in the designation of a Protecting Power named
by the Power of Origin, or it might withdraw a concurrence previously given, or it might take action before a Protecting Power could
be appointed at the onset of hostilities, or it might take action when a
Protecting Power has withdrawn and there has not been time for the
Power of Origin to go through the full procedure for the designation
of a successor Protecting Power. All of these examples fall within the
claul'le "no matter for what reason" ; in none of them is there justification for unilateral action by the Detaining Power.63
All of the Communist countries (and Portugal) made reservations
to Article 10 to the general effect that they would not recognize as
legal "requests by the Detaining Power to a neutral State or to a
humanitarian organization, to undertake the functions performed by
a Protecting Power, unless the consent of the Government of the country of which the prisoners of war are nationals has been obtained."&!
While there is a perhaps not unnatural tendency to view with suspicion this position, taken at Geneva almost uniquely by the Soviet Union
and its satellites,65 it appears to have a valid basis. If there is a Power
63 Pictet insists that the second paragraph of Article 10 "does not affect the
process of appointment of the Protecting Power" and that successor Protecting
Powers are not "substitutes" for prior Protecting Powers. Pictet, CommentaTY
117-18. The latter statement is completely correct. See note 56 supra. While his
statement indicates the opinion that this paragraph of Article 10 was not intended to affect the process of appointment of Protecting Powers, nowhere does he
even attempt to explain the significance of the clause "no matter for what reason."
64 Reservation of the Soviet Union to Article 10 of the 1949 Prisoner-of-War
Convention, 191 U.N.T.S. 367, maintaining the reservations made at the time of
signing, 75 U.N.T.S. 458-60, and 1 Final Record 355. The other reservations to
Article 10 are substantially identical to the foregoing (minor differences are probably due to translations from different languages), except that Hungary specified
that Article 10 "can only be applied if the Government of the State of which the
protected persons are nationals, no longer exists." Reservation of the Hungarian
People's Republic, 198 U.N.T.S. 338; 1 Final Record, 347. It would be interesting
to learn why the words "country of which the prisoners of war [protected persons] are nationals" (emphasis added) were used rather than "country of which
the prisoners of war are members of the armed forces."
65 See, e.g., Brockhaus, The U.S.S.R. 291. All of the Communist and Communistoriented countries which have adhered to the Convention since 1949 have made
similar reservations to Article 10.
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of Origin in esse, not only is its consent to the designation of a Protecting Power to act on its behalf essential, but it has the right to
make the selection in the first place. And the statements made at the
1949 Diplomatic Conference by the Soviet delegates making it clear
that they merely desired to limit the right of the Detaining Power
to select a substitute for a Protecting Power to those cases where there
is no existing Power of Origin was a limitation as to which there
should have been no dispute. It is to be hoped that by overruling the
Soviet thesis the 1949 Diplomatic Conference did not establish the
proposition that a Detaining Power may, on its own, select and designate a substitute for a Protecting Power even though there is a Power
of Origin in being.
The fourth paragraph of Article 10 establishes two requirements
for any neutral Power or organization invited by the Detaining Power
to perform the functions of a Protecting Power (pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 10) or any humanitarian organization invited by the Detaining Power or itself offering to perform the humanitarian functions normally performed by a Protecting Power (pursuant to the third paragraph of Article 10) : first it must act with a
sense of responsibility toward the Power of Origin ;66 and, second, it
must furnish assurances that it has both the capability and the intent
to perform the allocated functions and to perform them impartially.67
The fifth paragraph of Article 10 prohibits the derogation of the
prior provisions of Article 10 by special agreements between the
Detaining Power and the Power of Origin in those cases where the
latter is unable to negotiate with the Detaining Power on terms of
equality because of "military events" or the occupation of all or much
of its territory.68 Inasmuch as any such derogation would "adversely
affect the situation of prisoners of war," no matter what the relative
status of the two Powers, it was already prohibited by the last sen66 This requirement clearly indicates that the designation by the Detaining
Power of a substitute for a Protecting Power is not limited to instances where
the Protecting Power has ceased to exist as an independent sovereignty-unless
we are to assume that the sense of responsibility is owed to a Power of Origin
despite the fact that it no longer exists.
67 There is no indication as to whom the assurances are to be given. If the Detaining Power is to be the recipient, and there does not appear to be any other
entity that could or should be, the provision has little meaning-except as an exhortation-as the Detaining Power, by making the selection, has disclosed its acceptance of the competence of the particular Power or organization.
68 The wording of the provision appears to contemplate the parallel possibility
that the Detaining Power might be the weaker Power in the negotiations, rather
than the Power of Origin. As a practical matter, this is inconceivable. When
"military events" go against a Detaining Power, or its territory is occupied by the
enemy, it ceases to be a Detaining Power. See, e.g., Article XIX of the 1940 Franco-German Armistice Agreement.
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tence of the first paragraph of Article 6. 69 However, the draftsmen
of the Convention should certainly not be criticized for employing
what might be characterized as an excess of caution for the protection of prisoners of war. They were unquestionably motivated by the
events of World War II and an understandable desire to leave no
doubt that there was a specific prohibition of such conduct in any
future international armed confiict.70

c. PERSONNEL OF THE PROTECTING POWER
Article 8 of the Convention provides in part that
... the Protecting Powers may appoint, apart from their diplomatic and consular staff, delegates from amongst their own nationals or the nationals of other neutral Powers. The said delegates
shall be subject to the approval of the Power with which they are
to carry out their duties.
It is obvious that the Convention has accorded to a Protecting Power
three sources of personnel for the performance of its functions as
such Protecting Power: its diplomatic and consular officers stationed
within the territory of the Detaining Power;71 others of its nationals
specifically appointed for the purpose; and nationals of other neutral
Powers specifically appointed for the purpose.
The normal and natural source of personnel for the execution of
the functions of a Protecting Power is, of course, the diplomatic and
consular personnel of the Protecting Power already assigned to and
stationed in the territory of the Detaining Power. These officials.
working under the ambassador, are experienced, they are known to
the officials of the Detaining Power, and, perhaps most important,
they are already present within the area in which the Protecting
Power is to operate. It is, of course, true that they already have their
60 It is difficult to understand why Article 10 is included in the list of articles
in the first paragraph of Article 6 as one of the articles of the Convention expressly providing for special agreements, inasmuch as the prohibition mentioned
in the text is the only reference in the Article to such agreements.
70 After France and Beigium had capitulated in 1940, and were substantially
(France) or completely (Belgium) occupied, Germany refused to continue to
recognize a Protecting Power for either of them and required the "governments"
of the two countries to act on behalf of the prisoners of war whom Germany continued to hold. 2B Final Record 112. The French "Scapini Mission" and the Belgian "T'Serclaes Mission" rarely succeeded in obtaining a solution favorable to
the prisoners of war of any problem that arose; and frequently they acted as
agents to fulfill German demands which violated the provisions of the 1929 Convention, rather than as "substitutes" for the Protecting Powers.
71 Neither the 1929 Convention nor the Stockholm Draft that served as the
working document at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference included the term "consular" in specifying the authorized representatives of a Protecting Power. The
authorization for the use of this category of personnel by Protecting Powers was
proposed by Australia during the Conference and was unanimously approved. 2B
Final Record 58.

276

usual functions to perform; but many of these functions disappear
or are seriously curtailed upon the advent of war (commercial, immigration, tourists and tourism, etc.). While any large-scale armed conflict of lengthy duration will undoubtedly make it necessary for Protecting Powers to supplement their regular diplomatic and consular
staff within the territory of the Detaining Power, there will be numerous instances in which the Protecting Power will be able to perform
its functions with only its normal complement of officials, at least for
some considerable period of time and until the number of prisoners
of war held by the Detaining Power makes necessary a buildup of
the personnel performing the functions of the Protecting Power. Of
course, the term "diplomatic and consular staff" includes not only
those officials of the Protecting Power who were already stationed
within the territory of the Detaining Power at the time of the designation of the Protecting Power, but also any of its other diplomatic
and consular personnel who may be sent to replace or supplement them.
With the heavy commitments that Switzerland had during World
War II, it would obviously have been impossible for it to have made
even a pretense of performing its farfiung responsibilities as a Protecting Power without a considerable increase in its staffs in the
territories of the many Detaining Powers where it had agreed to serve
as a Protecting Power. To meet its personnel requirements in this
respect, the Swiss Government recruited locally and in Switzerland
and then sent to its various affected embassies and legations "camp
inspectors," who had the assigned duty of visiting prisoner-of-war
camps and labor detachments to assure that there was compliance by
the Detaining Power with the provisions of the 1929 Convention. This
is typical of the second source of Protecting Power personnel, the use
of which is authorized by the first paragraph of Article 8 of the 1949
Convention-the noncareer national who is selected by the government
of the Protecting Power solely for the purpose of assisting it to perform the functions of that office. 72 These individuals may also be
nationals of another neutral Power, the third source of Protecting
Power personnel authorized, but normally the Protecting Power would
resort to this type of selection only after it had exhausted its own
manpower potential. Of course, a major source of noncareer personnel is to be found among the nationals of the Protecting Power (and
of other neutral Powers) who are residing within the territory of
the Detaining Power when the use of additional personnel becomes
72 The Convention appears to use the term "representative" for the diplomatic
and consular personnel of the Protecting Power and "delegate" for the noncareer
personnel, whether nationals of the Protecting Power or of another neutral State.
Throughout this study the term "representative" has been used to include all individuals performing duties for the Protecting Power qua Protecting Power, without regard to their prior status. (The word "delegate" is used with respect to the
lCRe personnel. This latter is in accordance with the Convention practice.)
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necessary. The Protecting Power may find it more convenient, when it
has exhausted the manpower pool of its own nationals residing within
the territory of the Detaining Power as a source, to use nationals of
other neutral Powers residing within the territory of the Detaining
Power before resorting to the policy of recruiting its own nationals in
its own territory and sending them to the territory of the Detaining
Power.73
It will have been noted that these noncareer, or auxiliary, persons,
selected to assist in the performance by the Protecting Power of its
functions under the Convention, are subject to the approval of the
Detaining Power. This provision was the occasion for considerable
discussion at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference. No obj ection can be
perceived to this procedure. The diplomatic and consular personnel
of the Protecting Power stationed within the territory of the Detaining Power must have the normal approval of government of the
Power to which they are accredited (agrement, exequatur) required
for all such personnel, and anyone of them may, at any time, be
declared persona non grata by that Power. There is certainly no reason
why the individuals who will serve as supernumeraries to the Embassy
of the Protecting Power in the territory of the Detaining Power for
the purposes of the Convention should be subject to fewer restrictions
than the career personnel of the Embassy and the consular corps who
will actually be the first to perform the functions of a Protecting
Power for their country.74
73 The problem of the availability of competent personnel to serve as supernumeraries has been a matter of concern for a considerable period of time and
to many organizations. See, e.g., Resolution XXII of the XXth International Conference of the Red Cross, held in Vienna in 1965, reproduced in 1971 GE Documentation, II, at 020; Articles 2-5 of the Regulations Drafted by the Commission
Midico-Juridique de Monaco in 1971, reproduced in U.N., Human Rights, A/8370,
at 80-81 (English) and in 1972 I.L.A. Rep. 307 (French); 1971 GE Report 108, &
114; 1972 Basic Texts 7; and Article 6 of the 1973 Draft Additional Protocol.
(This latter, with some editing has become Article 6 of the 1977 Protocol I.) Thus,
Europeans without training or experience are likely to cause problems if given
duty in an area with a completely unfamiliar climate and culture. A camp inspector who reports that the prisoners of war are not getting enough meat, when
they are receiving their national diet of fish and rice, is not being very helpful;
nor is the inspector who criticizes the Detaining Power for not providing mat.
tresses when it has furnished the prisoners of war with the pallets on which they
are accustomed to sleep.
74 Siordet, Scrutiny 27. A provision of the Stockholm Draft that served as the
working document at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference would have required a Detaining Power to give "serious grounds" for any refusal to approve the nomination of a noncareer individual by a Protecting Power. Revised Draft Conventions
54; 1 Final Record 75. This proposal was c;mpletely lacking in logic. A State need
give no reason for refusing to agree to the assignment to a post in its territory
of a member of the diplomatic or consular service of a Protecting Power, or for
declaring such an individual persona non grata. Why, then, should it be required
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The fear has been expressed that a Detaining Power might arbitrarily refuse to approve any of the auxiliary personnel nominated
by the Protecting Power and thereby make it impossible for the latter
to perform its functions properly. But a Detaining Power so minded
could also, and with equal ease, arbitrarily decline to grant the necessary agrement or exequatur to replacement or supplementary diplomatic or consular personnel of the Protecting Power, or even declare
persona non grata a number of the persons in these categories already
serving within its territory. Any of these acts would constitute a violation of the spirit, and probably of the letter, of the Convention. Moreover, the Protecting Power, a friendly neutral Power, might well consider any such action by the Detaining Power as an unfriendly act.
Requiring the Detaining Power's approval of the individual supernumeraries is also logical from another standpoint. The individuals
concerned will, in the performance of their duties, be required to do
considerable traveling in a country at war. Any country at war will
have instituted controls on the right to enter into and to travel within
its territory. To tell it that it must accept anyone selected by the Protecting Power, even though it has good reason not to trust the particular individual, is to close one's eyes to the facts of life. And for
this same reason, the Detaining Power must retain the right to declare
members of the staff of the Protecting Power persona non grata,
whether the individual concerned has diplomatic, consular, or auxiliary
status.
It has been stated that the representatives of the Protecting Power
engaged in fulfilling its obligations in the territory of the Detaining
Power, have a triple responsibility: to their own government; to the
government of the Power of Origin; and to the government of the
Detaining Power.75 If this is another way of saying that these individuals must be completely :peutral and unbiased, it is correct. It would,
however, be less controversial to state, as did United States Secretary
of State Bryan in 1914, that they are "representatives of a neutral
power whose attitude toward the parties to the conflict is one of impartial amity."76

d. FUNCTIONS OF THE PROTECTING POWER
With only a very few exceptions, the draftsmen of the 1949 Convention apparently thought it best to avoid any attempt to specify in
detail the functions of a Protecting Power or even to include functions
in the form of specific powers granted to a Protecting Power. Most
frequently the functions are expressed either in the form of duties of
to do so with respect to noncareer supernumeraries? The provision of the Stockholm Draft was deleted at Geneva. 2B Final Record 58, 110.
75 de LaPradelle, Le controle 344. See also note 27 supra.
76 See note 11 supra. See also Franklin, Protection 114.

279

the Detaining Power or of rights of the prisoners of war. Where a
precedent had previously been established, it is usually set forth in
appropriate detail. Where no precedent had previously been established, the problem is frequently left to ad hoc decision. It was probably anticipated that such problems would be solved by the Protecting
Power through the exercise by it of the basic power guaranteed to it
by the first paragraph of Article 8, that of surveillance to ensure that
there is, at all times, full compliance with the provisions of the Convention; reinforced by the provisions of the second paragraph of
Article 8, which require the belligerents to facilitate "to the greatest
extent possible" the work of the Protecting Powers. Should a Protecting Power ascertain that there is a default in the performance by
the Detaining Power with respect to a particular provision, it is probably assumed that it will advise the Detaining Power thereof, and find
some means of procuring a correction of the situation, even though
the procedure by which it is to accomplish this is not specified.77
Nevertheless, the Convention does contain repeated references to
the institution of the Protecting Power and a function may usually
be implied in a particular instance merely from such reference. It is
indeed difficult to categorize these varied references to the Protecting
Power. Extremely broad categories are required and even then not
every function will fall within them. Several partially successful
efforts have been made to list these references on a functional basis.78
This discussion will consider them under three very general categories:
(1) powers and duties; (2) liaison functions; and (3) miscellaneous
functions.
(1) Powers and Duties
The basic and overriding power granted to a Protecting Power by
the 1949 Convention is, of course, that contained in the' first paragraph
of Article 8, the very first sentence of which, as we have seen, states
tnat the Convention "shall be applied with the cooperation and under
the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard
Ithe interests of the Parties to the conflict."79 Strangely enough, the
77 At the 1949 Diplomatic Conference the representative of New Zealand, Quen.
tin-Baxter, made the following statement: "It is not the function of the Protecting
Power to command or to overrule: it is its fuction to observe, to comment, to make
representations, and to send reports to the outside world. If we are faced with an
unscrupulous belligerent, the presence of the Protecting Power and the ability of
the Protecting Power to examine what is going on and to observe is the only preventive measure which we have." 2B Final Record 344.
78 Thus, Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 135 and Janner, Puissance protectrice 52, have each listed seven separate categories of functions of the Protecting Power, but the lists coincide with respect to only four functions. Still a third
functional listing appears in Pictet, Commentary 98-99 (reproducing a list that
had originally appeared in Siordet, Scrutiny 73-75).
79 See p. 262 supra,
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only extended debate on this extremely crucial article that took place
at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference concerned the selection of the
proper word to characterize the activities of the Protecting Power, and
that debate, it developed, occurred primarily as a result of difficulties
of translation. The delegates at the Conference were agreed that the
Protecting Power could not give orders or directives to the Detaining
Power. The idea desired to be conveyed was that the authority of the
Protecting Power would entitle it to verify whether the Convention
was being properly applied and, if necessary, to suggest measures on
behalf of prisoners of war.SO In the text of the Stockholm Draft, the
working draft used at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the words
"under the supervision of the Protecting Powers" were used in the
English version and the words "sous le controle des Puissances protectrices" in the French. This was acceptable to the French-speaking
delegates but was opposed by those whose mother tongue was English.
It eventually became apparent that the two groups were actually in
agreement and that the seeming dispute had arisen because the word
"controle" in French is much weaker than either "control" or "supervision" in English. The English-speaking delegations were given a
choice of a number of words to be used as a counterpart for the French
word, and unanimous agreement was ultimately reached on the word
"scrutiny."SI
The importance of the first paragraph of Article 8 may, perhaps,
be found to lie in the very generality of its phrasing. The fact that
the entire Convention is to be "applied with the cooperation" of the
Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers the latter to make suggestions to the Detaining Power with a view to the improvement of the
lot of the prisoner of war even with respect to areas in which no
specific reference is made to the Protecting Power. Thus, a Protecting
Power might suggest to, and seek to obtain the agreement of, the
Detaining Power that certain specified types of offenses committed
by prisoners of war be uniformly punished by disciplinary rather
than judicial measures, even though Article 83 contains no reference
to the Protecting Power. Similarly, the fact that the Convention is
to be applied "under the scrutiny" of the Protecting Power undoubtedly empowers it to investigate, and to request reports from the Detaining Power, in unspecified areas. Thus, a Protecting Power might seek
from the Detaining Power a complete report as to the reason for the
prohibition of correspondence, even though Article 76, dealing with
this subject, contains no mention of the Protecting Power; and, again,
it might seek a report as to the action taken with respect to a complaint made by a prisoner of war or a prisoners' representative,
80

2B Final Record 110.

SI Ibid. For some of the many English words proposed, see
See also Siordet, Scrutiny 24-25.

ibid., 19-20 & 57-58.
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through the Protecting Power, regarding the conditions of capitivity,
even though the second and fourth paragraphs of Article 78, which
provide for such complaints, do not specifically provide for such
reports.
The first two paragraphs of Article 126 empower the representatives of the Protecting Power to visit all places where prisoners of
war may be, themselves selecting the places they will visit and determining the frequency of the visits; to have access to all premises
where prisoners of war are confined; to go to the place of departure,
passage, and arrival of prisoners of war who are being transferred ;S2
and to interview prisoners of war and prisoners' representatives with:out witnesses. s3 The background of these provisions warrants discussion.
As we have seen, the difficulties encountered by Protecting Powers
early in World War I gradually disappeared and, before its conclusion, the Protecting Powers were generally enabled by the Detaining
Powers to visit and inspect prisoner-of-war camps.84 Thereafter, the
second paragraph of Article 86 of the 1929 Convention authorized
the Protecting Power to visit any place, "without exception," where
prisoners of war were interned. s5 Despite the clear import of this
provision, early in 1940 problems were again encountered in this
area. S6 However, apart from Japan, and, to some extent, Germany,
the Detaining Powers and the Protecting Powers of World War II
were largely able to resolve these difficulties in due course. Unfortunately, even though the problem which had arisen with regard to visits
to prisoner-of-war camps in occupied territories was well known, the
draftsmen of the 1949 Convention took no clear-cut action to ensure
against its recurrence. True, the first paragraph of Article 126 authorizes the representatives of the Protecting Power "to go to all places
where prisoners of war may be, particularly to places of internment,

82 See pp. 187-194 supra.
83 See p. 283 infra.
84 See note 13 supra. See also Charpentier, La
85 Two widely disparate authors have termed

Convention de Geneve 38-39.
this the most important activity
of the Protecting Power (Janner, Puissance protectrice 52) and one of the most
important saieguards ior prisoners of war (Mason, Prisoners of War 41).
86 6 Hackworth, Digest at 285. In particular, difficulties continued to be encountered with respect to visits to prisoner-oi-war installations located in occupied territories despite the "without exception" clause in the 1929 Convention.
Ibid.j I.M.T.F.E. 1129. (Article XI of the 1917 Anglo-Turkish Agreement had
specifically excluded prisoner-oi-war camps located in occupied territory from
those which the representatives of the Protecting Powers would be permitted to
visit. It may be assumed that this was one of the reasons for the "without exception" provision in the subsequently drafted 1929 Convention.)
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imprisonment and labour" ;87 and the second paragraph thereof states
that such representatives "shall have full liberty to select the places
they wish to visit"; and it was without any doubt the intent of the
1949 Diplomatic Conference that these broad provisions should include prisoner-of-war installations located in occupied territories.
However, any possibility of a dispute with regard to the interpretation of the quoted provisions could have been completely eliminated
by merely adding the phrase "including those located in occupied
territories" wherever appropriate. This was particularly desirable
because the omission of the words "Wit!loUt exception" could arguably
be construed as an intent to make the visitation privilege granted by
the first two paragraphs of Article 126 less all-inclusive than it had
been under the second paragraph of Article 86 of the 1929 Convention.
During World War II a number of Detaining Powers required that
the Protecting Powers provide them in advance with a schedule of
proposed visits to prisoner-of-war installations. This was sometimes
justified by the provision of the third paragraph of Article 86 of the
1929 Convention, which stated that" [t]he military authorities shall
be informed of their visits." During World War I it had frequently
been found that this type of requirement rendered the inspection comparatively ineffective;88 and events of World War II disclosed the
same deficiency. 59 The quoted provision of Article 86 of the 1929 Convention was omitted from Article 126 of the 1949 Convention, which
may be considered to be the successor article. However, there is no
specific rejection of the requirement, and it is unlikely that Detaining
Powers will discontinue the practice of requiring advance notice of
visits of inspection by representatives of the Protecting Power. oo
The procedure followed by the representatives of the Protecting
Powers in conducting an inspection of a prisoner-of-war installation
is not prescribed in detailS! and will largely be determined by the
87 The right of visitation granted by the first paragraph of Article 126 is iterated in Articles 56 as to labor detachments; 98 as to prisoners of war undergoing
disciplinary punishment; and 108 as to prisoners of war undergoing judicial
punishment.
88 United Kingdom, Foreign Office, The Treatment of Prisoners of War in England and Germany during the First Eight Months of the War 8 (1915); Charpentier, La Convention de Geneve 39 & 43.
89 Maughan, Tobruk 763; Mason, Prisoners of War 42. The ICRC delegates
labored under the same handicap. 1 ICRC Report 230 & 244.
90 United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Directive
190-6,22 September 1970, Military Police; ICRC Inspection of Detainee/Prisoner
of War Facilities, para. 6a, specified the action to be taken U[u]pon receipt of
proposed itinerary of the ICRe delegation." In recommending the deletion of the
provision requiring notice to the military authorities prior to a visit to a prisonerof-war installation, the leRe itself indicated that the procedure should be "settled
by practice." Draft Revised Conventions 133.
91 It may be noted that during World War II some Detaining Powers limited
the number of visits which could be made to a prisoner-of-war installation by the
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inspector himself, usually based upon specific instructions received
from his goverenment, the Protecting Power. 92 While the inspector
will normally wish to visit every part of the installation (quarters,
kitchens, mess halls, washrooms, toilets, showers, laundries, medical
facilities, recreational and sports facilities, prison, etc., etc.), a great
deal of his most valuable information with respect to deficiencies on
the part of the Detaining Power will usually come from the prisoners'
representatives and from the prisoners of war themselves. The second
paragraph of Article 86 of the 1929 Convention permitted him to
interview these individuals and provided that such interviews would
be "as a general rule without witnesses." Such a provision was, of
course, an invitation for the Detaining Power to make every case the
one which does not fall within the general rule. 93 This escape clause
was properly omitted when the first paragraph of Article 126 of the
1949 Convention was drafted, the words "as a general rule" being
dropped so that the interview is now to be "without witnesses" in
all cases. 94
Two practices have evolved with regard to the results of the inspections: first, the representative of the Protecting Power who makes
representatives of the Detaining Power. Article 126 now provides in its second
paragraph that "the duration and frequency of these visits shall not be restricted."
o2The checklist used by the United States as a Protecting Power in the early
period of World War II may be found in Franklin, Protection 224-25. Concerning
the checklist used by Switzerland, containing 50 items, see ibid., 224 n.83. One
critic characterized the inspection visits as being "tres courtes et tres superficielles." Tchirkovitch, Nouvelles conditions 106. Prisoners of war whose places of
internment were visited usually felt otherwise. See, e.g., American Prisoners of
War 30 & 39. There is always the danger that a camp inspector raised in one
culture will be unable to make a proper evaluation of the facilities of a prisonerof-war camp that are established for (and, perhaps, by) individuals of a completely different culture. See, e.g., note 73 supra.
93 I.M.T.F.E. Prosecution Exhibit No. 1965 included a set of Japanese "Detailed Regulations for the Treatment of Prisoners of War," dated 21 Apri11943.
(This was probably a revision of an earlier set dated 31 March 1942. See I.M.T.
F.E. 1107-08.) Article 13 of those Regulations provided that "a guard shall also
be present at this interview." This provision was the subject of repeated, but unsuccessful, objections by the Swiss Minister, representing the Protecting Power.
I.M.T.F.E. 1132.
M Here we are fortunate in having some very clear legislative history. The
Australian delegate at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference proposed the elimination
of the words "without witnesses" from the then Article 115 and the Venezuelan
delegate strongly opposed such action. 2A Final Record 303. The matter was referred to Committee II which, in its report, did not adopt the Australian
proposal. Ibid., 379. (In Franklin, Protection 227, the author states that during World War II it was standard practice for the representative of the Protecting Power to refuse to accept from, or to give to, a prisoner of war during the
private interview any paper or object not previously passed by the camp authorities. The United States has indicated its expectation that this practice will continue. U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 45c.)
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the inspection will usually conclude his visit by discussing with the
camp commander any objectionable practices which he has found to
exist, thus seeking to eliminate them without the need for a formal
report of the deficiency;95 and, second, the Protecting Power's formal
report is submitted to the Power of Origin only, not to the Detaining
Power.96 This latter practice probably evolved as a result of the desire
of Protecting Powers to avoid being the recipient of recriminations
from the Detaining Power because of an adverse report. 97 However,
the result is that, apart from any information received informally
by the camp commander directly from the representative of the Protecting Power making the inspection, the Detaining Power is not
advised of the existence of violations of the Convention of which it
may be completely unaware, and there is no opportunity for the Detaining Power to rectify the situation until it has attained the status
of a formal protest by the Power of Origin.
The importance of visits by representatives of Protecting Powers to
all places where prisoners of war may be detained was emphasized
during the hostilities in Vietnam, where the ICRC was permitted to
perform the humanitarian functions of the Protecting Power, including inspections of prisoner-of-war installations, in the Republic of
Vietnam (South Vietnam), but not in the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam (North Vietnam). The XXIst International Conference of
the Red Cross, an international organization which includes as members almost every national Red Cross Society in the world, meeting
in Istanbul in 1969, adopted a resolution calling upon "all Parties to
allow the Protecting Power or the International Committee of the
Red Cross free access to prisoners of war and to all places of their
detention" ;98 and the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted
a resolution in 1970 calling upon "all parties to any armed conflict ...
to permit regular inspection, in accordance with the Convention, of
all places of detention of prisoners of war by a protecting Power or
humanitarian organization such as the International Committee of
the Red Cross."99 Even though these two calls were completely disregarded by the Democr~ctic Republic of Vietnam, they take their place
in history as indicative of a widely acknowledged recognition of the
need for the Protecting Power to be permitted to perform the extremely important function allocated to it by the Convention-the
visitation to, and inspection of, all prisoner-of-war installations.
95 Franklin, Protection 226-27; Rich, Brief History 487.
96 Janner, Puissance protectrice 53; Rich, Brief History 487. For the different
ICRC practice, see p. 311 infra:
97 Franklin, Protection 225.
98 Resolution XI, XXlst International Conference of the Red Cross, 9 I.R.R.C.
614 (1969).
99 G.A. Res. 2676, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 77, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
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The second paragraph of Article 78 grants to prisoners of war the
right, which may not be restricted by the Detaining Power, to make
complaints to the Protecting Power "regarding their conditions of
captivity"-which, of course, means that they may complain to the
Protecting Power regarding alleged failures of the Detaining Power to
comply with the provisions of the Convention.100 These complaints
may be made and submitted through the prisoners' representative, or,
if the prisoner of war so desires, directly to the representatives of the
Protecting Power. 101 The third paragraph of Article 78 provides that
if a complaint is made in writing it must be transmitted immediately
and it may not be counted against the complaining prisoner of war's
correspondence quota ;102 and, even if it is found to be without any
foundation, such a complaint may not be the basis for the punishment
of the prisoner of war by the Detaining Power.10a
Other powers and duties of the Protecting Power are indeed varied.
For example, the first paragraph of Article 11 directs it to lend its
good offices to assist in settling disputes with respect to the application and interpretation of the Convention ;104 the second paragraph
of Article 65 authorizes it to inspect the finandal records of individual
prisoners of war ;105 the first paragraph of Article 71 empowers it,
in the overall interests of the prisoners of war, to permit the Detaining Power to reduce below the specified minimum the number of
items of correspondence which may be dispatched each month by
each prisoner of war ;106 the third paragraph of Article 72 permits
100 This practice originated in the bilateral agreements negotiated during the
course of World War 1. See, e.g., Article LIV of the 1918 Anglo-German Agreement and Article 118 of the 1918 United States-German Agreement. It was thereafter included in the second paragraph of Article 42 of the 1929 Convention.
101 During World War II some Detaining Powers required that the complaint
be in writing and be submitted through channels (e.g., German Regulations, NC}.
20, para. 226) ; while others permitted it to be made orally and directly to the
representative of the Protecting Power while he was visiting and inspecting a
prisoner-of-war installation. POW Circular No.1, para. 165.
102 See note II-179 supra.
103 Article 120 of the 1918 United States-German Agreement made an unfounded complaint a basis for punishment if it contained "intentionally insulting statements or intentionally false accusations." This would provide too much latitude
to the Detaining Power and would have a chilling effect on the exercise by prisoners of war of their right to complain. Article LIV of the 1918 Anglo-German
Agreement merely permitted the Detaining Power to withhold complaints "which
are intentionally false or are written in insulting language!' During World War
II, on at least one occasion, the Japanese tortured a prisoner of war for daring
to complain to the representative of the Protecting Power and prevented him from
seeing the representative on the latter's next visit to the prisoner-of-war camp.
[.M.T.F.E.1132-33.
104 See p. 81 supra.
105 See note II-470 supra.
106 See p. 147 supra.
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it, once again in the overall interests of the prisoners of war, to propose a limit on the number of packages which each prisoner of war
may receive;107 the first paragraph of Article 75 allows it to take over
the transport of capture cards, correspondence, packages, and legal
documents should military operations prevent the Detaining Power
from fulfilling its obligations in this respect ;108 the first paragraph of
Article 96 gives it the right to inspect the records of disciplinary
punishment ;109 and the second and fifth paragraphs of Article 105
establish its duty to find counsel for a prisoner of war against whom
judicial proceedings have been instituted, and its right to attend
the trial. l1O

(2) Liaison Functions
In its liaison capacity the Protecting Power is actually little more
than a conduit-but a very important one. It serves as the means of
relaying necessary communications between the Detaining Power and
the Power of Origin. Not infrequently, it will be the sole means readily
available for the transmittal of messages between the two belligerents. And, of course, while a great many liaison functions are specifically set forth in the 1949 Convention, this is one area in which
a protecting Power may improvise and undertake liaison missions which
are not among those enumerated in the Convention.
Article 23, paragraph three, requires the Detaining Power to give
to the Protecting Power for relay to the Power of Origin information
concerning the geographical location of all prisoner-of-war camps so
that the prisoners of war will not, as has happened, accidentally become the target of their own compatriots.111 The fourth paragraph of
Article 60 provides that the reasons for any limitation placed by the
Detaining Power on the amount of funds made available to prisoners
of war from advances of pay must be conveyed to the Protecting Power, presumably for transmittal to the Power of Origin. ll2 The first
paragraph of Article 62 obligates the Detaining Power to advise the
Protecting Power, for relay to the Power of Origin, of the rate of
daily working pay wp.ich it has fixed.ll3 Transmittals of funds by
prisoners of war to recipients in their own country are, pursuant to the
third paragraph of Article 63, made by notification from the Detaining Power to the Power of Origin through the medium of the Pro107 See p. 161 supra. (The article fails to indicate to whom the proposal is to
be made.)
108 See P. 162 supra.
109 See p. 325 infra.
110 See lip. 334, & 336-337 infra.
111 See p. 123 supra.
112 See p. 200 supra.
113 See p. 202 supra.
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tecting Power. 114 Notifications with respect to the status of the financial
accounts of prisoners of war (Article 65, last paragraph) 115 and of
prisoners of war whose captivity has terminated, through escape,
death, or any other means (Article 66, first paragraph) 116 are also
sent by the Detaining Power to the Power of Origin through the
medium of the Protecting Power. The first paragraph of Article 68
provides that claims of prisoners of war for injury or disease arising
out of assigned work are similarly transmitted.ll7 Article 69 requires
that information with respect to the measures taken by the Detaining
Power to enable prisoners of war to communicate with the exterior
must be transmitted to the Power of Origin through the Protecting
Power.118 The first paragraph of Article 100 states that the Protecting
Power must be informed, presumably for relay of the information to
the Power of Origin, as well as for its own use, of all offenses punishable by death under the laws of the Detaining Power.1l9 And Article 128 provides that during the course of the hostilities each belligerent will furnish to the other, through the Protecting Power, an
official translation of the Convention (this assumes that the Party's
language is other than English, French, Russian, or Spanish, in which
languages there are, pursuant to Article 133, universal translations)
and of all laws and regulations adopted to ensure the application
thereof.
In several instances the Convention provides for the exchange of
information between the belligerents without specifying how this exchange is to be accomplished. Unquestionably, these are areas in
which, as stated above, the Protecting Power would feel qualified to
intervene, even though it has no specific mandate. For example, the
last paragraph of Article 21 provides for an exchange of information
between belligerents as to their respective laws and regulations on
the subject of parole;120 the first paragraph of Article 43 provides
for an exchange of information with respect to military titles and
ranks;121 and the second paragraph of Article 43 requires the DeSee p. 208 supra.
pp. 209-210 supra.
116 See p. 211 supra.
117 See p. 251 supra.
118 See p. 153 supra.
119 See p. 339 infra. This presumption is buttressed by the fact of the requirement of the second paragraph of Article 100 that other offenses may not thereafter be made punishable by death without the concurrence of the Power of
Origin.
120 See p. 400 infra.
121 See p. 168 supra. Subparagraph (b) of Article 33, the comparable provision
with respect to medical personnel, provides that the belligerents "shall agree at
the outbreak of hostilities on the subject of the corresponding ranks of the medical
personnel." To reach such an agreement the belligerents would assuredly avail
themselves of the services of their Protecting Powers.
114

1111 See
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taining Power to recognize the promotions of prisoners of war of
which it has been notified by the Power of Origin :122 but none of these
provisions states how the information is to be exchanged or conveyed.
The Protecting Powers are available and competent to perform this
liaison function; and it may be assumed that either the belligerents
will request their services for this purposes or the Protecting Powers
will themselves offer their services for the transmittal of the required
information.
(3) Miscellaneous Functions
There are a number of references to the Protecting Power in the
1949 Convention which cannot rightly be designated as powers or
duties, but which are likewise not precisely liaison functions. For lack
of a more descriptive term, and because, for the most part, they bear
little or no relationship to each other, they are here considered as
miscellaneous functions.
Thus, the second and third paragraphs of Article 12 provide that
if a Detaining Power, to whom prisoners of war have been transferred
by another Detaining Power, fails to carry out the provisions of the
Convention with respect to those transferred prisoners of war, the
transferor Detaining Power will, upon being notified to that effect
by the Protecting Power, either take measures to correct the situation
or request the return of the prisoners of war concerned.123 And the
first paragraph of Article 58 indicates, without specifically so providing, that at some point after the outbreak of hostilities the Detaining
Power and the Protecting Power will enter into an arrangement relating to the possession of money by prisoners of war.124
The last paragraph of Article 60 directs the Detaining Power to
provide to the Protecting Power "without delay" the reasons for any
limitations imposed on the amount available to prisoners of war from
their advances in pay; the last paragraph of Article 78 provides that
the prisoners' representative may send periodic reports to the Protecting Power concerning the conditions of captivity and the special
needs of the prisoners of war ;125 the fourth paragraph of Article 79
requires the Detaining Power to inform the Protecting Power of its
reason therefor when it refuses to approve a duly elected prisoners'
representative ;126 and the last paragraph of Article 81 requires the
122 See

p. 169 supra.
105-106 supra.
124 See p. 196 supra.
125 See pp. 301-302 infra. Presumably, matters falling within the first area
would be a basis for investigation upon the next visit of representatives of the
Protecting Power to the particular prisoner-of-war camp; and matters falling
within the second area would be passed on to the Power of Origin or to representatives of humanitarian or relief organizations operating in the territory of the
Detaining Power.
126 See p. 297 infra.
123 See pp.
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Detaining Power to inform the Protecting Power of its reasons for
dismissing a prisoners' representative. 127 In none of these articles is
there any indication of the action which it is contemplated that the
Protecting Power will take when the required information is given
to it. While the information might, in the exercise of the Protecting
Power's liaison function, be passed to the Power of Origin, in many
cases this action alone would have little or no significance. However,
under its general right to scrutinize the application of the Convention,
the Protecting Power would undoubtedly, in appropriate cases, take
issue with the Detaining Power's action.
Further, the first two paragraphs of Article 121 provide that the
Detaining Power shall investigate and make a full report to the Protecting Power with respect to every death or serious injury of a prisoner of war caused or suspected to have been caused by a sentry,
another prisoner of war, or any other person, or where the cause of
death is unknown; and the last paragraph of Article 121 provides
that if guilt is indicated, the Detaining Power shall prosecute the
responsible persons. Certainly, it is expected that the Protecting Power
would forward a copy of the report of the incident to the Power of
Origin; but it is equally certain that the Protecting Power would,
on its own initiative, make demarches to the Detaining Power if it
felt that the investigation had been inadequate or that a prosecution
indicated by the investigation had not taken place.128
It is believed that the foregoing short presentation of only a few
of the provisions contained in the 1949 Convention clearly discloses
that a Protecting Power has certain miscellaneous functions, both
specified and unspecified, which can probably become whatever a
particular Protecting Power desires them to be.
(4) Limitations on the Activities of ~rotecting Powers
The last paragraph of Article 8 imposes two specific limitations on
the activities of the representatives of the Protecting Power: first,
they may not exceed their mission; and, second, in performing their
mission they must "take account of the imperative necessities of security" lpf the Detaining Power.129 Certainly, it should not even be
127 See p. 299 infra.
128 Pictet, Commentary 571. This was apparently the reaction of the ICRC,
when performing the humanitarian functions of the Protecting Power in India in
1972, to episodes involving the killing of a number of Pakistani prisoners of war
by Indian guards. Washington Post, 23 December 1972, at A-16, col. 1.
129 The Soviet Union had proposed a provision restricting the activities of the
representatives of the Protecting Power with respect to "sovereignty," "security,"
and "military requirements." 2B Final Record 59. The French representative at the
1949 Diplomatic Conference then made a substitute proposal which included not
only the two limitations mentioned but also a 'proposed third sentence of the
last paragraph of Article 8 discussed in the text. The Soviet proposal was rejected
and the French proposal was adopted. Ibid., 74 & 110-11.
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necessary to admonish a representative of the Protecting Power that
he should not go beyond his mission. (If he does so, or attempts to
do so, he will very quickly find himself persona non grata, not only
to the Detaining Power but also to his own State, the Protecting
Power.) There can therefore be no objection to this provision which
is, at worst, surplusage.
If we could be certain of the meaning of the directive to "take
account of the imperative necessities of security" of the Detaining
Power, we would be better able to judge the need for its inclusion in
the Article. What are some of the "imperative necessities of security"
of the Detaining Power? As we shall see in a moment, they are not
"imperative military necessities." In any event, inasmuch as the representatives of the Protecting Power are the ones called upon to make
the ultimate decision, and not the Detaining Power, any attempt by
the latter to restrict the activities of the representatives of the Protecting Power on the basis of "imperative necessities of security"
when, in the considered opinion of such representatives there is no
valid ground for such a restriction, would undoubtedly constitute a
flagrant violation of the provisions of the Convention and would
result in a protest by the Protecting Power and, probably, by the
Power of Origin. 130
As originally approved, the last paragraph of Article 8 had a third
sentence which did permit the Detaining Power to restrict the activities of the representatives of the Protecting Power "as an exceptional
and temporary measure when this is rendered necessary by imperative
military necessities."131 At that time an article indentical to Article 8
was contained in the drafts of each of the four conventions then under consideration at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference.132 When the
matter eventually came before the Plenary Meeting, it was proposed
that the limitation quoted immediately above be retained in the First
and Second Conventions but that it be deleted from the Third and
Fourth Conventions. The importance of the distinction drawn between
the two pairs of conventions was fully appreciated at the time of the
drafting of the conventions and was the occasion for some spirited
debate. 133 While on its face the decision reached by the Diplomatic
130 Of course, if the representative of the Protecting Power decides that there
are no "imperative necessities of security" to be taken into account and the Detaining Power disagrees, the representative of the Protecting Power may shortly find
himself persona non grata; but this will not affect his decision.
131 See note 129 supra.
132 It was the so-called Common Article 61717/7. In the final drafts of the four
conventions it became Common Article 8/8/8/9.
133 The proponents of the making of the distinction between the two pairs of
conventions argued that it was "obvious and reasonable that the activities of a
Protecting Power in sea warfare and on the field of battle must be restricted," but
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Conference to adopt the proposal was plainly a victory for those
who sought to exclude to the maximum extent the possibility of any
shackles being placed on the Protecting Power in the performance
of its functions with respect to prisoners of war, it remains to be
seen whether this result was actually attained.134
The second paragraph of Article 126, authorizing the representatives
of the Protecting Power to select the prisoner-of-war installations
which they desire to visit, continues to include in its provisions a
restriction similar to the one that was stricken frem the last paragraph of Artcle 8. It provides that such visits "may not be prohibited
except for reasons of imperative military necessity, and then only as
an exceptional and temporary measure."135 Assuming that the Detaining Power desires to impose such "exceptional and temporary" restrictions on the visits of representatives of the Protecting Power to
certain prisoner-of-war installations, or the even more extensive restrictions on the activities generally of the Protecting Power which
are asserted by some States to exist, whether or not specified in the
Convention, how and by whom is the decision to be made as to whether
"imperative military necessity" does, in fact, exist? There is one school
of thought which has advanced the position that it would be illogical
to permit the determination to be made by the Detaining Power itself,
as it would be judging its own case, and which insists that only the
Protecting Power can validly make such a determination. 136 While
there is much to be said in favor of this position from a strictly
humanitarian point of view, it cannot, as a practical matter, be justified. If, for example, the Detaining Power d~ems it essential to keep
that as to the Prisoner-of-War and Civilians Convention "the vital force which
animates those rules and gives them effect is the presence of the Protecting Power." 2B Final Record 344.
134 The pessimism which may be apparent in the text is occasioned by the fact
that the Soviet Union took the position that, even without such a restrictive limitation in the Convention, it would exist in fact. Ibid., 345. It is to be feared that
this attitude presages an attitude by the Soviet Union, with respect to the activities of the Protecting Power, similar to that taken by Japan during World War
II. See note 21 supra.
135 The failure to strike this provision from the second paragraph of Article
126 when it was stricken from the last paragraph of Article 8 was not inadvertent. 2B Final Record 344-45. It is the sole area in which the Convention specifically permits the activities of the Protecting Power to be restricted by the Detaining Power. While it is, of course, a very important one, it is not believed that a
Detaining Power could really justify the imposition of such a restriction except
in very rare cases, such as prohibiting visits to extremely forward collecting points
during the course of an actual attack.
136 Pictet, Commentary on the First Convention 101. Even there it is admitted
that "this is precisely what it [the Protecting Power] would, in such a case, be
debarred from doing. It will only be possible to show after the event whether or
not the restriction was justified." In Pictet, Commentary 611, published 8 years
later, a much more realistic approach was taken.
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representatives of the Protecting Power temporarily out of an area
where prisoner-of-war installations are located, lest military movements therein inadvertently lead to the disclosure of important impending military actions, there would be little logic in compelling it
to advise the Protecting Power what and why it was so doing in order
to permit the latter to determine whether imperative military necessity actually existed and whether the restriction on visits to that area
was really justified. This is unquestionably a matter which will adjust
itself in the course of events and through reciprocal actions of the
belligerents, inasmuch as time and experience will very quickly result
in an informal mutual appreciation as to where the line is to be
drawn.137
3. Conclusions
The past century has seen tremendous advances made in the concept of the Protecting Power as an institution of international law
both in the role which it is called upon to play and in the prestige
which it enjoys and which contributes substantially in enabling it to
perform the numerous functions which have now been assigned to it.
It appears beyond dispute that
The presence of the Protecting Powers today remains the sole
means of putting a brake on the excesses of Detaining Powers,
the sole element of moderation and of morality in the treatment
of enemy persons, their belongings, and their interests; this was
noted and affirmed many times at Geneva. 13S
The accomplishments of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference with respect to the Protecting Power reveal clearly that the nations of the
world were generally prepared to erect a solid basis for its activities.
It was assigned a mission of close observation of the application of
the provisions of the conventions drafted at that Conference, including the Prisoner-of-War Convention, a mission which necessarily
incorporates within it a right to call to the attention of the Detaining
Power any failure of performance which it finds and to report any
such failure of performance to the Power of Origin; a sizable expansion was made in its specified functions and, correlatively, in its
power of authority; provision was made for substitutes for Protecting Powers in order to ensure that prisoners of war would at all times
benefit from the presence and activities of a Protecting Power, thus
correcting the situation which had arisen all too frequently during
In Pictet, Commentary 611 the following remedial procedure is suggested:
the Protecting Power will be able to check afterwards whether the prohibition
of visits has been used by the Detaining Power to violate the Convention. In any
event, it is not in the interests of the Detaining Power to misuse this reservation,
because it would very soon be suspected of deliberately violating the Convention
by evading supervision by qualified witnesses."
138 Heckenroth, Puissances protectrices 229 (transl. mine).
137
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World War II; and the use of the institution of the Protecting Power
was extended not only to the redrafted First and Second Conventions,
but also to the completely new Fourth Convention. These few examples alone demonstrate the great distance that had been traversed
since 1907 when the Hague Regulations of that year contained no
reference whatsoever to the Protecting Power.
In many respects the provisions of the 1949 Convention relating
to the Protecting Power, like its provisions in other areas, represent
compromises. Positions reached solely in order to bring about agreement between the extremes of opposing viewpoints can rarely be
considered perfect, and the present case is no exception. However, it
is better to have imperfect solutions which are acceptable to the great
majority of States than to have perfect solutions which are acceptable to, and will be complied with by, only a few States. The provisions
of the 1949 Convention relating to the Protecting Power unquestionably represent a great step forward in the evolution of the international law of war and would undoubtedly be viewed with amazement
by even the most humanitarian of those who drafted the first Red
Cross Convention in 1864, or even by those who had acted on behalf
of the Protecting Powers as recently as 1914, at the beginning of
World War 1.
The Protecting Power is now a generally accepted and firmly established institution of international law. It is the subject of international agreements to which most of the States of the world are
parties. It has been called upon to function during critical periods
in recent world history and it has performed its mission in a satisfactory manner. It is foreseeable that in any future major international armed conflict it will be called upon by the belligerents to
perform not only the missions specifically assigned to it in the 1949
Convention, but also numerous new functions on behalf of States at
war.

c.

THE PRISONERS' REPRESENTATIVE
1. Historical
The protective agency with which we shall now concern ourselves
has come into being and evolved during little more than the past
century as an institution of international law functioning uniquely
in the prisoner-of-war area. Today it is known as the "prisoners'
representative" in English and as the "homme de confiance" ("man
of confidence") or "representant des prisonniers de guerre" ("prisoners' representative") in French; but it has had many other titles. 139
139 It has been known as the "spokesman," "man of confidence," "camp leader,"
"agent," "prisoners' representative," etc. See Maughan, Tobruk 781. The draft
convention approved at Stockholm used the term "spokesman!' Revised Draft Conventions 80-81. As late as 8 July 1949 the delegates at the Diplomatic Conference
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The origin of the institution which has become the prisoners' representative can be traced to the Franco-Prussian War (1870-71)
when the Prisoner-of-War Agency which the still very youthful ICRC
had just brought into being140 recommended to the military authorities of the belligerents-and the latter agreed-that one prisoner of
war be designated as a "man of confidence" in each prisoner-of-war
camp to be responsible for the receipt and distribution of collective
relief supplies.l4l Despite the success of this innovation, the idea was
not incorporated into either the 1899 or the 1907 Hague Regulations.
However, it was widely adopted in the various World War I agreements,142 and the prisoners' representative became an accepted fact
which was duly institutionalized in Articles 43 and 44 of the 1929
Convention. Moreover, the functions of the office had broadened considerably since its initiation in 1870, no longer being confined to relief
activities. Thus, Article 43 provided that the prisoners' representatice (therein termed the "agent") should be entrusted "with representing them [the prisoners of war] directly with military authorities and protecting Powers" as well as "with the reception and dist~ibution of collective shipments."
Like any other wartime relationship, the prisoners' representative
did not always operate as intended during World War II.143 For
example, some Detaining Powers disregarded the directive of the
first paragraph of Article 43 that the prisoners of war should be
allowed to "appoint" their own prisoners' representative ("agent") .144
However, as far as the prisoners of war themselves were concerned,
the prisoners' representative was a definite success ;145 and the realwere still referring to the "spokesman" in their discussions. 2A Final Record 37273,380. The Draft Report of Committee II (Prisoners of War), distributed on 19
July 1949 (ibid., 404), used the term "prisoners' representative" (ibid., 570, 59192) , and that term thereafter remained in the Convention.
140 2 lCRC Report 5. See also note II-208 supra.
141 Preux, Homme de confiance 449; 1 lCRC Report 342-43.
142 Preux, Homme de confiance 450; 1 lCRC Report 343.
143 The lCRC seems to have considered it improper that the transit camps in
Great Britain did not have prisoners' representatives. Ibid. It is rather difficult to
see how any Detaining Power could be expected to go through the formal procedure of having prisoners of war select prisoners' representatives in transit camps
with their daily prisoner-of-war population shifts.
144 American Prisoners of War 1; 1 lCRC Report 343.
145 Ibid., 345. One author has related an incident that occurred early during
World War II when the general opinion among the prisoners of war was that the
prisoners' representative was a rather useless office. As a result of an unsolved
theft of German Government property, collective punishment consisting of loss of
food for two days (a doubly prohibited penalty) was imposed on all of the prisoners of war at the camp where the theft had occurred, numbering some 20,000. The
prisoners' representative complained to the camp commander and the collective
punishment order was rescinded. "From that day we had a man who was our representative and in whom we placed our confidence." Tedjini, Temoinage 632
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ization of this was undoubtedly a strong motivating factor in the
further institutionalizing of the prisoners' representative as well as
the further extensive broadening of his functions which are to be
found in the 1949 Convention.U6
2. Selection of the Prisoners' Representative
The first paragraph of Article 79, the introductory paragraph of
the chapter of the 1949 Convention dealing with prisoners' representatives, is concerned with the manner of selecting these individuals, who are to represent the prisoners of war of their installation
before the military authorities of the Detaining Power, the Protecting
Power, the ICRC, and any other aid organization. They are to be
"freely elected," the vote is to be by "secret ballot," an election is to
be conducted every six months, or when a vacancy occurs, and the
prisoners' representative is eligible for .reelection. None of these provisions was to be found in the 1929 Convention. None of them would
seem to present any serious problem of interpretation or application;
but that problems can be created where none appears to exist has
already been frequently demonstrated. Thus, the events in Korea demonstrated that when belligerents care little about the rule of law, or
about what happens to their own personnel who have been captured,
they can and will ruthlessly disregard any provisions of a humanitarian convention if they consider that their ultimate objective will
be better served by such a procedure. The North Korean and Chinese
prisoners' representatives in the prisoner-of-war camps maintained
by the United Nations Command were interested in furthering the
Communist political cause and not in ensuring the protection of their
fellow prisoners of war.147 And the selection of prisoners' representatives among the United Nations Command personnel in Communist
prisoner-of-war camps, particularly those maintained by the Chinese,
was a farce-but not a humorous one. 14S And while the practices in
this regard in the prisoner-of-war camps maintained by the South
Vietnamese was far from reaching the nadir of Communist practices,
prisoners' representatives were frequently selected by the camp commander, rather than by the prisoners of war.149

(trans!. mine). This article by a former French prisoner of war, himself a longtime prisoners' representative, gives a valuable insight into life in a prisoner-ofwar camp in general (the author was a prisoner of war from June 1940 to May
1945) and the activities of a prisoners' representative in particular.
146 The prisoners' representative is mentioned in 18 different articles and in two
Annexes of the Convention.
147 Vetter, Mutiny 65; UNC., Communist War 5-6.
148 U.K., Treatment 16-17; Miller, The Law of War 246. The activities of some
of these "progressive" prisoners' representatives were undoubtedly one of the
reasons for the drafting and promulgation of Article IV of the Code of Conduct.
149 Vietnam, Article-by-Article Review, Article 78.
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There are not a few Powers among the present community of
nations who consider it to be "democratic" to present the voter with
a ballot containing no alternatives-in this case, with a single candidate, probably handpicked by the camp commander. Can it then be
said that the prisoners of war are being permitted to "freely elect"
their prisoners' representative? What if the camp commander rejects
any candidate for prisoners' representative whom he considers "unfit,"
refusing to permit the name of any candidate to appear on the ballot
unless the individual concerned has previously demonstrated his willingness to "collaborate" with the camp authorities? Could the candidate who emerges successfully from this type of screening be "entrusted with representing" the prisoners of war in disputes with the
camp authorities concerning the conditions of captivity? Is a ballot
"secret" when the military authorities of the Detaining Power insist
upon examining it before it is placed in the ballot box? All of these
procedures were followed by the Chinese Communists in Korea.15o
And, unfortunately, there is no reason to believe that they will not
be the manner in which prisoners' representatives will be selected
in any future major international armed conflict involving like-minded nations as belligerents.
However, we must assume that the governments of the large majority of States that are Parties to the 1949 Convention are lawabiding and will apply the provisions of the Convention in good faith,
and that practices such as those adopted by the Chinese Communists
in Korea will be the exception rather than the rule. Based upon that
assumption, any prisoner of war may be a candidate for election as
the prisoners' representative at the installation in which he is confined; the prisoners of war of that installation will cast their secret
ballots for the candidate of their choice; and the candidate receiving
the greatest number of votes will be elected.l5l At this point the
Detaining Power may legally impose its will upon the election-but
only negatively. Under the provisions of the fourth paragraph of
Article 79 the successful candidate for prisoners' representative may
not assume his functions in that capacity until he has been approved
by the Detaining Power.152 If the Detaining Power refuses to approve
him, it would appear, although it is not specifically so provided, that
See note 148 supra.
If the prisoners' representative so elected is not the ranking individual in
~he prisoner-of-war camp, acceptance of his status by the other American servicemen in the camp might well be a violation of Article IV of the Code of Conduct.
See the Instructional Material for this article of the Code.
152 It should be noted that this requirement of approval of the prisoners' representative by the Detaining Power applies only to one who is elected and that it
therefore does not apply to the prisoners' representative who obtains his office by
virtue of being the senior officer present. See text in connection with note 156
infra.
150

151
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the prisoners of war would have no alternative but to continue to
conduct elections until an individual acceptable to the Detaining Power
has been elected. By this method a Detaining Power probably could,
eventually, bring about the election of a collaborator just as successfully as it could by improperly controlling the names which appear
on the ballot. That is, of course, basically the same problem which
was encountered with respect to the provisions of the first paragraph
of Article 8 that require Detaining-Power approval of the representatives of the Protecting Power.lli3 There is one additional safeguard
here against arbitrary action by the Detaining Power-if it refuses
to approve and accept the elected prisoners' representative, it is required to advise the Protecting Power of the reason for such action. lM
However, the Protecting Power is apparently so advised for informational purposes only, as the Convention does not authorize it to take
any action even if it considers the reason given by the Detaining
Power to be totally without basis. Nevertheless, the need to advise
the Protecting Power of its disapproval and of the' reason therefor
should constitute at least a small brake on completely arbitrary action
by the Detaining Power and will, in some cases, undoubtedly inhibit
repetitive arbitrary disapprovals of the individual chosen by his fellow prisoners of war to be their representative in dealing with the
Detaining Power.
The election of a prisoners' representative just discussed refers to
a prisoner-of-war installation in which no officers are confined. The
second paragraph of Article 79 covers the other two possibilities:
camps where there are only officers; and camps where there are both
officers and enlisted men.1/i5 In either such case, the senior officer
present is automatically the prisoners' representative.lli6 If there are
only officers in the camp, one or more "advisers" are to be "chosen"
by the other officer prisoners of war; if it is a mixed camp, with
1153

See p. 278 supra.

lli4 This resembles the procedure which was originally included in, but was deleted from, the first paragraph of Article 8. See note 74 supra.
llili Retained medical personnel and chaplains are not prisoners of war (S66 pp.
71-72 supra) and are, therefore, not included under these provisions. Subparagraph (b) of Article 33 places upon the senior medical officer in a camp the duties
with respect to retained medical personnel, officer and enlisted, that the prisoners'
representative has with respect to prisoners of war. Chaplains act individually
on behalf of themselves only. Like the senior medical officer, each has access to
the camp commander. Pictet, Commentary on the First Convention 249-50; U.S.
Army Regs. 633-50, para. 32e.
lli6 Apparently some question arose as to whether this was so under the last
paragraph of Article 43 of the 1929 Convention, as that Article used the term
"intermediary" for the senior officer present, rather than the term "agent," used
throughout that Convention to signify what we now call the prisoners' representative. Preme, Homme de confiance 457; 1 ICRC Report, 346; Rich. Brief History
898. The wording of the second paragraph of Article 79 clarifies the former am-
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both officers and enlisted men, one or more "assistants" are to be
"elected" by the latter.157
There is one set of circumstances under which the senior officer
present will not necessarily be the prisoners' representative. The third
paragraph of Article 79 provides that officer prisoners of war of the
same nationality as the enlisted prisoners of war constituting a labor
detachment shall be assigned to such detachments to perform the
necessary administrative duties and that these officers "may be elected as prisoners' representatives." In other words, even though the
. labor detachment will, to a certain extent, be a "mixed" camp, the
senior officer detailed to it to perform the administrative details will
not automatically be the prisoners' representative, but he will be
eligible for election to that office. I58
The prisoner of war who is elected prisoners' representative or who
occupies such office by virtue of his seniority of rank must, of course,
be one who is interned in the prisoner-of-war installation in which
he is to function as prisoners' representative. The last paragraph of
Article 79 establishes certain other qualifications that must be met:
he must always have "the same nationality, language and customs
as the prisoners of war whom he represents." Inasmuch as the third
paragraph of Article 22 provides that prisoners of war are to be
assembled in camps or camp compounds according to the same three
criteria,159 this should cause no particular problems. Moreover, if
prisoners of war with different nationalities, languages, and customs
are confined in different compounds in the same prisoner-of-war

biguity. The senior officer present is specifically stated to be the prisoners' representative. One author sees a conflict of interest for this officer between the requirements of the Convention (to further the welfare of his fellow prisoners of
war) and those of the Code of Conduct (to defeat the enemy). Smith, Code of Conduct 112. Such a situation would certainly seem to have the same reprehensible
characteristics as those attributed to the Communist prisoners' representatives in
the United Nations Command camps in Korea. See text in connection with note
147 supra.
157 The functions of the "advisers" and the "assistants" are probably intended
to be identical, the difference in terminology being a recognition of the military
hierarchy. Preux, Homme de confiance 457. Preux also explains the use of the
word "chosen" for the officers instead of the word "elected" used for the enlisted
men as being the result of a desire to avoid imposing the formality of an election
on the officers. Ibid., 458. Presumably the officers would make their choice by some
type of consensus.
158 Ibid., 459. If an officer is elected prisoners' representative, his assistants
must be enlisted men.
159 See p. 175 supra.
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camp/60 each compound is to have its own prisoners' representative,
so that each such prisoners' representative will meet the stated qualifications. 16l
There are two methods by which a Detaining Power may rid itself
of a prisoners' representative whom it finds to have gadfly characteristics-dismissal162 and transfer. Article 81 envisages the possibility
that a Detaining Power may dismiss a prisoners' representative inasmuch as its last paragraph provides that in such an event the
Protecting Power must be informed of the reasons therefor. 163 As
is the case when the Detaining Power conveys to the Protecting Power
the reason for its refusal to approve a prisoners' representative who
has been elected, the Convention merely calls for the communication
of the information and does not authorize the Protecting Power to
pass on the merits of the action. Of course, the dismissal would mean
that a vacancy existed and, under the first paragraph of Article 79,
this would necessitate a new election.
The fifth paragraph of Article 81 foresees situations in which the
prisoners' representative may be transferred away from the prisonerof-war camp in which he is performing his functions. If he is so
transferred, he ceases to occupy the position of prisoners' representative. This is obviously a simple way for the Detaining Power to
160 The last paragraph of Article 79 refers to "different sections of the camp,"
while the third paragraph of Article 22 refers to "camp compounds." The latter
is the technical term properly applied to the subdivisions of a prisoner-of-war
camp. (It might also be noted that both the third paragraph of Article 22 and the
first sentence of the last paragraph of Article 79 used the terminology "nationality, language and customs" (emphasis added), while the second sentence of the
last paragraph of Article 79 substitutes an "or" for the "and" in both the English and the French versions of the Convention. Obviously, the use of the disjunctive in this instance was intentional.)
161 This practice had, apparently, been followed by at least some Detaining Powers during World War II. See, e.g., German Regulations, No. 22, para. 266. It
would seem to eliminate the problem involving the United States Code of Conduct
that might arise in a camp with prisoners of war from the United States armed
:forces if the senior officer in the camp were from the armed force of another
Power of Origin. But see Manes, Barbed Wire Command 17.
162 Although the Convention is silent on the subject, it is not believed that the
Detaining Power could dismiss an officer prisoners' representative of a prisonerof-war camp, as he would continue to be the senior officer present and there is no
provision for anyone other than the senior officer to be the prisoners' representative in a camp with either an all-officer or a mixed prisoner-of-war population.
163 In the debriefing which occurred after the repatriation of prisoners of war
at the end of World War II, a former prisoner of war :from Stalag 2B (in Germany) stated that after he had served as the camp prisoners' representative :for
almost a year, the Germans refused to deal further with him as prisoners' representative when they discovered that he was Jewish. American Prisoners of War 55.
It would appear that there is no provision of the 1949 Convention which would
prohibit this :from being given by a Detaining Power to a Protecting Power as
the "reason" for the dismissal of a prisoners' representative.
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rid itself of a prisoners' representative whom it considers "undesirable," as it need not even devise a reason to give to the Protecting
Power. The only limitation on its right to take this action is the
requirement that it must give the prisoners' representative sufficient
advance notice of the proposed transfer to allow him a reasonable
period of time in which to brief his successor with regard to current
problems.
Reference has been made to the selection of officer advisers or enlisted assistants when the prisoners' representative is an officer. Apart
from these, Article 81 provides in its second paragraph that the prisoners' representative may himself select such additional assistants as
he may require. Although the Convention does not mention the Detaining Power in this regard, it may be assumed that the latter will
have some veto power if it decides that the prisoners' representative
is attempting to use too many prisoners of war as assistants, particularly because, as we shall see, the prisoner's representatives and
all of his assistants are paid out of canteen funds or, if there are
none available, then by the Detaining Power.l64
One aspect of the provisions dealing with the subject of the designation of prisoners' representatives is somewhat confusing. The second paragraph of Article 56 provides that labor detachments "shall
remain under the control of and administratively part of a prisoner
of war camp"; yet the third paragraph of Article 79 indicates that
"labor camps"165 are to have their o'\vn prisoners' representatives. It
has been suggested that the prisoners' representative in the labor
detachment represents the other prisoners of war of that detachment
vis-a-vis the detachment commander, while the camp prisoners' representative represents them vis-a-vis the camp commander when a
problem is not resolved at the lower leve1. 166 This is probably as good
a solution as can be devised, even though the labor detachment prisoners' representative is not designated as an assistant to the camp
prisoners' representative by the Convention. Moreover, such a system
of hierarchical echelons would definitely not be applicable to the prisoners' representative of the various compounds containing prisoners
of war of different nationality, language, and customs selected pursuant to the fifth paragraph of Article 79, each of whom would be of
164 But see Preux, Homme de confiance 469-70. He believes that, while the Detaining Power may express its displeasure at the number of assistants designated
by the prisoners' representative, the final decision is to be made by the latter.
165 This is apparently just another instance of careless draftsmanship. There
is no doubt that it refers to the "labor detachments" of Article 56.
166 Preux, Homme de confiance 456. The fourth paragraph of Article 81 indirectly
supports this interpretation as it provides that communications between the prissoners' representative in the labor detachment and the prisoners' representative
of the principal prisoner-of-war camp are not to be included in the personal mail
quotas established under the first paragraph of Article 71.
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equal stature and equally entitled to direct access to the camp commander and to the representatives of the Protecting Powers.
3. Functions of the Prisoners' Representative
The prisoners' representative has three major functions and a
myriad of less important ones. The major functions are (1) representing the prisoners of war before the military authorities, the Protecting Power, the lCRe, and other similar organizations [Article
79, first paragraph]; (2) furthering their physical, spiritual, and
intellectual well-being [Article 80, first paragraph]; and (3) supervising their organization for mutual assistance and collective relief
[Article 80, second paragraph].167
The third paragraph of Article 81 authorizes a prisoners' representative to visit all premises where prisoners of war are detained.
Obviously, this provision refers to premises constituting a part of
the prisoner-of-war installation of which he is the prisoners' representative. Moreover, this same paragraph provides that all prisoners
of war (of the particular installation) must be permitted to consult
freely with the prisoners' representative ;168 and they are authorized,
by the second paragraph of Article 78, to submit complaints concerning the conditions of their captivity to the prisoners' representative
for transmittal to the Protecting Power. To reinforce this latter provision, the first paragraph of Article 126 requires that the Protecting
Power be permitted to interview the prisoners' representative without
witnesses; and the clear implication of the second paragraph of Article 126 is that this may be done as often as the Protecting Power
desires. Of course, by this method the prisoners' representative wI1l
be in a position to present to the representative of the Protecting
Power not only the complaints formally submitted to him for transmittal, but also those which he has received informally, as well as
any that he desires to make himself, particularly as, in his capacity
161 The first paragraph of Article 80 assigns to the prisoners' representative the
broad function of furthering "the physical, spiritual and intellectual well-being of
prisoners of war." Preux believes that the three major functions of the prisoners'
representative are relief activities, relations between the prisoners of war and the
military authorities, and supervision of the application of certain guaranties expressly provided by the Convention. Ibid., 464. The present author would, for the
most part, include the last function enumerated by Preux under the major funetion of representing the prisoners of war before the military authorities. U.S. DA
Pam 27-161-2, at 84, has still a third list of the functions of the prisoners' representative.
168 In an attempt to preclude a recurrence of one situation noted during World
War II that left certain prisoners of war with virtually no channel of eomplaint
concerning the conditions of their captivity, frequently very bad, the second paragraph of Article 57 specifically provides that prisoners of war employed by private
individuals or concerns shall have the right to communicate with and to receive
communications from the prisoners' representative of the prisoner-of-war camp to
which they are administratively assigned. (See p. 246 supra.)
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as prisoners' representative, he will usually be aware of all that is
transpiring in the camp.169 When the information that he has thus
received and the inquiries that he has made indicate that the Detaining Power is not complying fully with the provisions of the Convention, the prisoners' representative may conclude that the particular
violation is of a nature that can be corrected by bringing it to the
attention of the camp commander; or he may decide that it is of a
nature that requires that it be brought to the attention of the Protecting Power.l7° If he follows the former path, only to learn that
the camp commander denies that the procedure objected to constitutes a violation of the Convention, or that he refuses to take any
action (perhaps because the condition objected to has been specifically
ordered by higher military authority of the Detaining Power), the
prisoners' representative would clearly have no alternative but to pass
the complaint on to the representative of the Protecting Power under
the authority contained in the last paragraph of Article 78.
The second paragraph of Article 41 provides that all regulations,
orders, notices, and pUblications issued by the Detaining Power and
pertaining to prisoners of war must not only be posted in the prisonerof-war camps in a language which the prisoners of war understand,
but that copies must be furnished to the prisoners' representative.
He is thus in a position to ensure that the contents of such documents are in accord with the Convention and that the prisoners of
war are actually made aware thereof. Moreover, he then has a file
of all such documents and will be in a position to intervene to ensure
that prisoners of war are not punished for the violation of a rule
which has not been properly promulgated by posting and delivery
to the prisoners' representative, or where the violation occurred before the rule was properly so promulgated.
As we have seen, the first paragraph of Article 79 bestows upon
the prisoners' representative the function of representing the prisoners of war "before the military authorities." There can be no
question that the camp commander and his subordinates come within
this terminology-but what of the higher military authorities of the
Detaining Power, right up to the Ministry of Defense itself? One
author considers in inconceivable that a camp prisoners' representative should communicate directly with the military authorities of
the Detaining Power superior to the camp commander.l7l There is
169 During World War II the prisoners' representative is stated to have had the
tasks of "forwarding of petitions and complaints, making of enquiries, and collecting of information." 1 JeRe Report 344.
170 Of course, he should winnow out the complaints which are without basi8, 8S
the submission of groundless complaints merely detracts from the weight given to
valid ones. Ibid., 345.
171 Preux. Homme de confiance 456.
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considerable merit to this view. However, the fourth paragraph of
Article 81 provides that the prisoners' representative must be accorded facilities for "communication by post and telegraph with the detaining authorities."172 Surely, the draftsmen of the Convention did
not believe that the prisoners' representative had a need for these
facilities merely in order to communicate with the camp commander
of his own prisoner-of-war camp. It would thus appear that the prisoners' representative has at least an implied right to communicate
directly with any level of the military authorities of the Detaining
Power ;173 but it would also appear that when he is unable to obtain
satisfaction from the camp commander he would be well advised to
channel his resort to higher authority through the Protecting Power,
rather than to use the implicit right of direct communication.
During World War II the German military authorities ordered that,
in general, all searches of prisoner-of-war quarters for security purposes should be accomplished in the presence of the prisoners' representative or his equivalent. 174 This appears to fall within the category
of relations with the military authorities and is a logical function
of the prisoners' representative. On the other hand, the United States
issued an order making the prisoners' representative ("spokesman")
responsible for the "maintenance and cleanliness of the quarters."175
This does not appear to be the type of function which should be
assigned to the prisoners' representative. 176
It is, perhaps, appropriate to mention at this point several of the
provisions of the Convention that were included in order to protect
the prisoners' representative and to facilitate his mission. Thus, the
first paragraph of Article 81 provides that he is not to be required
to perform any other work if to do so will make the accomplishment
of his mission more difficult. Inasmuch as the functions of the prisoners' representative in most prisoner-of-war camps will be full time,
not only for the prisoners' representative himself but also for his
assistants, this position will normally mean that he should not be
172 In explaining this provision at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, the representative of the ICRC referred to its provisions for communicating "with the Protecting Power and the various relief organizations," pointedly omitting any reference
to the fact that the "detaining authorities" were also mentioned therein. 2A Final
Record 289-90.
173 U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 32, provides that postal and telegraph facilities
be made available to the prisoners' representative for the purpose of communicating with, among others, "United States Army authorities." This certainly
appears to refer to military authorities at a higher level than the camp commander.
174 German Regulations, No. 44, para. 811.
175 POW Circular No.1, para. 44.
176 It must be borne in mind that the prisoners' representative has no disciplinary powers, all such powers residing exclusively in the Detaining Power. See the
third paragraph of Article 96. See also German Regulations, No. 82, para. 511;
U.S. Army Regs. 633-50, para. 32k.
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required to perform any other work.177 The third paragraph of Article
80 provides that the prisoners' representative may not be held responsible ex officio for offenses committed by other prisoners of war.
This is particularly relevant with respect to incidents such as the
construction of a tunnel to be used for the purpose of escape. The
military authorities of the Detaining Power will probably assume,
and with some justification, that this could not have occurred unknown
to the prisoners' representative--but whether he knew of it or not,
he is not to be held responsible if he did not personally participate
in it.178
We have just seen that a prisoners' representative may appoint the
assistants that he considers necessary and that he may visit all of the
premises constituting a part of the prisoner-of-war installation of
which he is the prisoners' representative. In order that he be physically
able to exercise this right of visitation, the second paragraph of Article 81 requires the Detaining Power to grant him "a certain freedom of movement" so that he may visit labor detachments under his
jurisdiction, as well as the points at which relief supplies are received,
warehoused, issued, etc. The fourth paragraph of Article 81 not only
instructs the Detaining Power to facilitate the prisoners' representative's efforts to communicate by post and telegraph with the military
authorities, the Protecting Power, the ICRC, the Mixed Medical Commissions, and other aid organizations,179 but also that such communications are not to be counted against the personal mail quotas established under the first paragraph of Article 71. 180
Finally, the third paragraph of Article 62 provides that the prisoners' representative, his advisers, and his assistants shall receive their
working pay181 out of the canteen fund, with the prisoners' represen177 In officers' camps and in mixed camps this will present no problem, as the
senior officer present will be the prisoners' representative and officers may not be
compelled to work. See p. 224 supra. If an officer is elected prisoners' representative of a labor detachment, he will probably be required to continue to work, both
because his official duties should not be that onerous and because he was specifically assigned to the detachment to perform necessary administrative functions
(for which he had, presumably, volunteered).
178 This is another prohibition of vicarious punishment in a specific instance.
For the general prohibition of collective punishment, see Article 87, third paragraph.
179 Note the difference between the enumeration set forth here and that set forth
in the first paragraph of Article 79. See p. 295 supra. Concerning the Mixed
Medical Commissions, see pp. 411-412 infra.
180 It is possible to interpret the provision concerning mail quotas as being applicable only to communications between the prisoners' representative of a labor
detachment and the prisoners' representative of the principal prisoner-of-war installation. However, it is believed that the broader interpretation given in the text
is not only more logical but that it is supported by the legislative history. See 2A
Final Record 405.
i81 Concerning "working pay," see pp. 201-205 supra.
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tative himself setting the scale of such payments, subject to the approval of the camp commander. Should there be no canteen fund, then
the Detaining Power is required to pay these individuals "a fair working rate of pay." No provision is made as to how the fair working rate
of pay is to be set, so it appears that the Detaining Power would
make that decision. It certainly could not establish a scale of pay
for the prisoners' representative and his staff that was less than that
established for the prisoners of war generally under the first paragraph of Article 62.182
With respect to the prisoners' representative's function of furthering the physical, spiritual, and intellectual well-being of the prisoners
of war, established by the first paragraph of Article 80 of the Convention, there is little to say. All of the discussions of the activities
of the prisoners' representative during World War II agree that the
prisoners' representatives were extremely active and successful in
this field, organizing sports, orchestras, and theatricals, establishing
camp libraries and publications, arranging for educational facilities,
and sometimes even acting in a spiritual capacity.183
It will be recalled that the office of the predecessor of the prisoners'
representative, the "man of confidence," was specially created for the
purpose of providing a reliable prisoner of war who would supervise
the organization of the prisoners of war for mutual assistance and
collective relief. 184 Under the provisions of the second paragraph of
Article 80 this remains one of the major functions of the prisoners'
representative. The second paragraph of Article 73 states specifically
that even a special agreement between the belligerents cannot affect
the prisoners' representative's function of taking possession of all
collective relief shipments and of distributing them or otherwise disposing of them in the interests of the prisoners of war.185 Annex III
to the 1949 Convention, entitled Regulations concerning Collective
Relief, contains the detailed rules with respect to the receipt, warehousing, distribution, and other disposal of collective relief supplies
that are to apply in the absence of a special agreement. In all aspects
of this matter, the prisoners' representative has both the responsi182 During the discussion of pay for prisoners' representatives in the Subcommittee of Financial Experts at the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, it was suggested
that if the prisoners' representative were to be paid by the Detaining Power, the
latter might be able to use this as a source of pressure on the former. 2A Final
Record 541. Nevertheless, the alternative method of payment adopted is exactly
the one concerning which the warning was issued.
183 1 ICRC Report 344-45; Preux, Homme de confiance 462, 470; Tedjini,
Temoinage 633.
184 See p. 294 supra.
185 Article 125, fourth paragraph, requires the prisoners' representative to furnish a receipt for relief supplies received from relief organizations. This gives
some assurance to the donors that the supplies donated actually reached the prissoners of war and were not intercepted and used by the Detaining Power.
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bility and the power for the handling of all collective relief supplies
at his prisoner-of-war camp.1S6
The various functions of the prisoners' representative that we have
just discussed are those that he exercises on behalf of the entire
prisoner-of-war population of the prisoner-of-war installation that
he represents. In addition, there are many functions that he exercises
on behalf of individual prisoners of war. Thus, under the third paragraph of Article 48 he will ensure that the personal (and community)
property that prisoners of war, transferred from his prisoner-of-war
camp to another one, were unable to take with them because of the
weight limitations contained in the preceding paragraph of Article 48,
is forwarded to them; under Annex V, implementing the third paragraph of Article 63, he countersigns, with the prisoner of war concerned, the notification of the transmittal of funds abroad from the
personal account of the prisoner of war ;187 under the first paragraph
of Article 65 he countersigns entries in the account of a prisoner of
war on behalf of the individual concerned; under the fourth paragraph of Article 96 he must be advised of any disciplinary punishment pronounced against a prisoner of war ;188 under the last paragraph of Article 98 he is to be given custody of parcels and remittances of money addressed to individual prisoners of war who are
undergoing confinement as a disciplinary punishment, and he is given
the authority to donate any perishable items contained in such parcels
to the camp infirmary; under the last paragraph of Article 104 he
is to receive the same advance notice of the Detaining Power's intention to institute judicial proceedings against a prisoner of war that
the Protecting Power receives ;189 under the first paragraph of Article
107 he is to receive the same notice of a judgment and sentence
pronounced upon a prisoner of war, and of appellate rights, that the
Protecting Power receives ;100 and under the last paragraph of Article
113 he has the right to be present at the examination by a Mixed
Medical Commission of any prisoner of war who presents himself for
that purpose.191
It is obvious that the many functions delegated to the prisoners'
representative reach into every activity in the prisoner-of-war camp
affecting the prisoners of war. The extent of the impact of his activities upon the daily life of the prisoners of war is incalculable. An efficient prisoners' representative can literally mean the difference between survival or death for the prisoners of war confined in camps
186 Concerning relief supplies generally, see pp. 158-163 supra.
187 Concerning the transmittal of funds abroad, see pp. 207-208 supra.
188 See

p. 325 infra.
note V-85 infra.
p. 338 infra.
191 See p. 412 infra.
189 See
190 See
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maintained by some Detaining Powers. While using common sense and
carefully selecting his fields of battle, he must be prepared to challenge
any action of the Detaining Power, or its representatives, that he considers to be a violation of the provisions of the Convention and contrary to the best interests of the prisoners of war. The strong and
competent prisoners' representative will quickly win the confidence
of the prisoners of war whom he represents and the respect of the
prisoner-of-war camp commander and his staff. When he has accomplished this, he has already done much to improve the lot of the
prisoner-of-war population of the camp of which he is the prisoners'
representative.
D. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
1. Historical
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) came into
being as a result of the fact that Henri Dunant, a Swiss civilian, was
a witness to the postbattle horrors resulting from the battle of Solferino (June 1859) between the Austrians and the Allies (primarily
the French). Approximately 40,000 of the 300,000 men who participated in that battle were killed or wounded during its course of little
more than 12 hours-and, subsequently, there were thousands of additional deaths from among the participants, many of them because of
the lack of any system of organized medical care.192 In November 1862
Dunant's book, Souvenir de Sollerino (Memory of Solferino) was
published in Geneva; in February 1863 the "Committee of Five," the
genesis of the ICRC, was created by the Geneva Public Welfare Society; an International Conference, called by the Committee of Five, met
in Geneva in October 1863 ; and on 22 August 1864, less than two years
after the publication of Dunant's book, the Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the
Field had been drafted and signed by a Diplomatic Conference called
by the Swiss Government. 193 This was the first of the long series of
humanitarian Geneva Conventions which culminated in the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949.194
102 For the story of this episode and its humanitarian repercussions, see generally Gumpert, Dunant--the Story of the Red Cross.
193 All of the major European and several American States had been invited to
participate in the Diplomatic Conference. The United States, then engaged in the
American Civil War, was represented by an observer. It did not ratify the 1864
Convention until 1882.
104 The national delegates to the Diplomatic Conference for the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which met in Geneva in 1974, 1975, 1976, and 1977, signed a Final Act on
10 June 1977 and signed a Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (herein referred to as the 1977 Protocol I) on 12 December 1977.
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Despite the first word in its title, the ICRC is not international (except in its outlook). Its headquarters are located in Geneva; its membership is exclusively Swiss in nationality; and it maintains this
membership by co-option. Not a little of the success of the ICRC may
undoubtedly be attributed to the fact that, since the Congress of
Vienna, Switzerland has existed under a state of perpetual neutrality
which, unlike that of certain other small European states less fortunate from the point of view of geography, has been maintained. This
has ensured the ICRC not only the fact of neutrality, but an aura of
neutrality, a situation that would have been impossible had it been
based in any other country of today's world.
Traditionally, the delegates of the ICRC have been found wherever
there have been victims of disaster, natural or man-made. Earthquakes, floods, droughts, and armed conflicts, international or internal,
all produce human victims; and all quickly bring an offer of assistance
from the ICRC. We shall, of course, inquire into only its activities on
behalf of prisoners of war in international armed conflict.
2. The Position of the ICRC in International Armed Conflict
Article 9 of the 1949 Convention contains the basic international
recognition of the ICRC and its activities on behalf of prisoners of
war. It states:
The provisions of the present Convention constitute no obstacle
to the humanitarian activities which the International Committee of the Red Cross ... may, subject to the consent of the Parties
to the conflict concerned, undertake for the protection of prisoners
of war and for their relief.
It will be noted that this Article follows immediately after the basic
Article with regard to the Protecting Power. This positioning was
unquestionably intentional. During World War II it was sometimes
necessary for the ICRC to exert great effort in order to overcome the
impression of some belligerents that it was attempting to duplicate
the functions of the Protecting Power. While it did, for the most part,
succeed in convincing them that such was not the case195-by placing
the two basic provisions of the Convention relating to the Protecting
Power and the ICRC in such juxtaposition, and by the phraseology
used-the 1949 Diplomatic Convention clearly indicated its expectation
and intent that the two institutions could, without any interference in
each other's activities, function side by side.196
195

1 IeRe Report 39.
Unquestionably, many of their activities are identical-but this was understood and intended. How else can we explain a provision such as that contained in
the last paragraph of Article 126 that specifically gives to the IeRe delegates
"the same prerogatives" of visitation of prisoner-of-war installations as the first
two paragraphs of Article 126 give to the representatives of the Protecting Power?
196
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Moreover, recognizing the very real possibility of a shortage of
states available to act as Protecting Powers in any future major international armed conflict, the first paragraph of Article 10 authorizes
the belligerents "to agree to entrust [the duties of the Protecting
Power] to an organization which offers all guaranties of impartiality
and efficacy."191 The ICRC is unquestionably such an organization;
and, as has already been noted, it has formally announced that, contrary to the position previously taken by it, it will in the future
consider accepting an invitation to act in that capacity.198
Furthermore, the second paragraph of Article 10 provides that,
absent a Protecting Power or an organization designated under the
first paragraph of that Article, the Detaining Power may designate a
neutral Power, or such an organization as mentioned above, to perform
the functions of a Protecting Power.190 The ICRC, of course, likewise
meets the requirements for designation under this provision. And the
third paragraph of Article 10 provides that when the Detaining Pow.er
is unsuccessful in obtaining the required services under the second
paragraph of Article 10, it may request or accept "the offer of the
services of a humanitarian organization, such as the International
Committee of the Red Cross, to assume the humanitarian functions
performed by the Protecting Power."200
From the foregoing it is clear that it was the hope of the 1949 Diplomatic Conference that the Protecting Power and the ICRC would
function simultaneously, supplementing each other, in order to provide the prisoners of war with the maximum protection and service;
but that should there for any reason fail to be a Protecting Power, it
was intended that the ICRC-or another similar organization, if such
there be-should fill the vacuum and perform either all of the functions of a Protecting Power, or, at least, all of its humanitarian functions, if any of its functions were deemed not to fall within that
category.20l
3. Activities of the ICRC
As we have seen, the provisions of the first two paragraphs of
Article 126 authorize the representatives of the Protecting Power to
visit all places where prisoners of war may be and give them wide
1117 See
1118 See

note 58 supra.
note 59 supra.
109 See p. 271 supra.
200 As has been seen (see note 43 supra), the leRe has now reached what is
believed to be the correct conclusion that all of the functions of the Protecting
Power are basically humanitarian in nature. It had previously felt differently.
See notes 59 and 60 supra.
201 When the ICRC, or any other organization, acts pursuant to either of the
first three paragraphs of Article 10, it does so as a substitute for a Protecting
Power, not as an actual Protecting Power which, by definition, must be a State.
See note 2 supra.
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latitude in performing this function. 202 The fourth paragraph of that
Article provides that the leRe delegates "shall enjoy the same prerogatives."203 All that has been said in this respect with regard to the
representatives of the Protecting Power is equally applicable to the
delegates of the leRe. That the leRe performed this function, and
performed it vigorously, is evidenced by the statistics-during World
War II leRe delegates made a total of 11,175 visits to installations
where prisoners of war and civilian internees were confined.204 During
their visits the delegates of the leRe, like the representatives of the
Protecting Power, have the right to interview prisoners of war and
without witnesses. 205 They will thus learn of the complaints of the
prisoners of war concerning the conditions of their captivity.206 In
addition to this parallel right of visitation,207 the leRe delegates are
also given a parallel right of access to the prisoners' representative.208
While the prisoners' representative can, and probably will, on occasion,
advise the delegates of the leRe of deficiencies in the conditions of
captivity,209 this is probably not the principal reason for giving the
See pp. 281-284 supra.
196 supra. That paragraph also provides, like the last sentence of
the first paragraph of Article 8 concerning the "delegates" of the Protecting
Power, that ICRC delegates must be approved by the Detaining Power.
204 1 ICRC Report 83. During and after the Sino-Indian War (1962), the People's Republic of China gave another example of its ability to disregard, or to misinterpret in its own interest, the clearest possible provisions of international agreements voluntarily entered into by it. Despite the unambiguous provisions of the
last paragraph of Article 126, the PRC took the position that this article did not
apply to the ICRC! Draper, People's Republic 366. See also note 47 supra.
205 A general statement of the procedure followed by an ICRC delegate during
and after a visit to a prisoner-of-war installation is presented in Anon., The Protection of Prisoners of War. 141.R.R.C. 191.
206 This right of the ICRC to interview prisoners of war without witnesses and
to receive complaints was contested by some Detaining Powers during World War
II. 1 ICRC Report 342. Of course, there was no specific provision such as the last
paragraph of Article 126 in the 1929 Convention. However, these functions were
performed by the ICRC during World War II. See, e.g., ibid., 346; and POW Circular No.1, para. 99. Although the ICRC is not mentioned in the second paragraph
of Article 78, concerning complaints, it is somewhat difficult to visualize what else
the ICRC delegate and the prisoner of war are going to discuss in the private interviews that the last paragraph of Article 126 certainly authorizes.
207 The right of visitation includes not only the prisoner-of-war camp, but "aU
places where prisoners of war may be." For several other places specifically mentioned in the Convention, see note 87 supra.
208 The first paragraph of Article 126, the fourth paragraph of Article 126, and
the first paragraph of Article 79, and the fourth paragraph of Article 81 all authorize communication between the prisoners' representative and the ICRC delegates.
209 After almost a decade and a half of additional study of the subject, the author
is inclined to be a little less sure that the legislative history of the second paragraph of Article 78 establishes that the ICRC delegates are not authorized recipients of prisoner-of-war complaints. See Levie, Prisoners of War and the Protecting Power, 55 A.J.I.L. 374, 395-96, and particularly note 55 therein. As indicated
202

203 See note
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prisoners' representative and the delegates of the ICRC a mutual right
of access. It will be recalled that the position which we now denominate the "prisoners' representative" was originally brought into existence for the purpose of supervising prisoner-of-war relief matters.210 It is undoubtedly in this area that the need for communication
between the prisoners' representative and the delegates of the ICRC
will be most needed and most useful. A very considerable part of the
time of the ICRC delegates will be occupied with the extremely important function of ensuring that relief supplies, both from neutrals
and, at times, from the Power of Origin, reach the prisoner-of-wa:t:
camps where they are most needed and·are thereafter properly distributed. The provisions of the Convention having to do with relief
matters uniformly place the ICRC on the special footing which it
rightly deserves because of its traditional major interest in such
matters.211
The procedure followed by the ICRC in its relations with the opposing belligerents differs in one very material respect from that of the
Protecting Powers-unlike the latter, who submit the reports of their
visits to the Power of Origin only,212 the ICRC submits its .reports to
both the Power of Origin and the Detaining Power ;213 in fact, if there
is another Power concerned, as where the Capturing Power has transferred the custody of the particular prisoners of war to another Detaining Power, such Capturing Power will also receive a copy of the
ICRC report. 214 There is much to be said for this practice.215
It has already been mentioned that the ICRC originally conceived
and executed the idea which brought into being the Central Prisoners
of War Information Agency.216 Its continued interest and usefulness
in this respect has been recognized in the first paragraph of Article
123, authorizing the ICRC to propose to the belligerents (as it has
done in the past) that such an Agency be organized. It may be asin the text here, it was probably not the principal reason for providing for communication between the prisoners' representative and the ICRC-but the ICRC
has traditionally performed the function of receiving complaints without a legislative directive and the new guarantee of access in private practically ensures that
it will continue to do so.
210 See p. 294 supra.
211 See, e.g., Articles 125; 72; 73; the first two paragraphs of Article 75; and
Annex III, Article 9. For a review of ICRC relief activities during World War II,
see 3 ICRC Report, passim.
212 See p. 284 supra.
213 1 ICRC Report 240-41; Rich, Brief History 489.
2141 ICRC Report 241. Among their other improper actions, during World War
II the Japanese insisted on censoring the copy of the reports sent by the ICRC to
the Power of Origin. Ibid., 229. A censored report has, of course, little significance.
215 A detailed outline of the matters covered by the report may be found at 1
!CRC Report 233-38.
216 See p .154 supra.

312
sumed that, in any future major international armed conflict, not only
will the ICRC propose the organization of this central clearinghouse
of information,217 but that it will, as it has in the past, assume the
responsibility for the establishment and operation thereof. 218
The ICRC is a unique organization which has played an indispensable humanitarian role in every armed conflict for more than a century. There is every reason to believe that, if permitted to do so by
the belligerents, it will continue to play such a role in future armed
conflicts, making the life of prisoners of war on both sides more livable and, in many cases, being the major reason for the survival of
prisoners of war. It remains to be seen whether the ICRC will be
permitted to perform the functions envisaged for it by the 1949 Diplomatic Conference, as it has been in the majority of cases, or will be
denied the right to perform any of these functions, as it was by the
Soviet Union (1940-45),219 North Korea (1950-53) ,220 the People's
Republic of China (1950-53; 1962),221 and North Vietnam (c. 196573).222
E. OTHER IMPARTIAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS
Article 9 of the 1949 Convention provides that humanitarian activities for the benefit of prisoners of war may be performed not only by
the ICRC, but also by "any other impartial humanitarian organization."223 The Convention does not identify any organization, other
217 During a visit to the lCRC in Geneva the author was shown through the
archives of the World War II Central Agency. The name of a close personal friend
who had been a prisoner of war during World War II was mentioned-and in a
matter of minutes his card was produced with entries showing the several prisoner-of-war camps in which he had been interned, with the dates of arrival at, and
departure from, each one.
218 For a review of the activities of the Central Prisoners of War Agency during
world War II, see 2 lCRC Report, passim.
219 1 lCRC Report 408-36. Having denied the lCRC the right to function on its
territory during World War II, during the Korean hostilities (1950-53) the Soviet
Union supported the charge of the Chinese Communists that the lCRe was a
"capitalist spy organization." U.K., Treatment 33-34. Under the circumstances, it
is unexpected, indeed, to find the Soviet Union communicating to the Secretary-General of the United Nations its belief in the need for the lCRC to undertake additional tasks relating to the protection of human rights in armed conflict. U.N.,
Human Rights, A/8052, at 119-20.
220 The frustration of the lCRC in its attempts to be permitted to function in
North Korea is well-documented in the two volumes of lCRe, Conjlit de Coree,
passim.
221 Draper, People's Republic, 353-67.
222 lCRC Annual Report, 1970, at 40-41; ibid., 1972, at 40-41. The confidence
in the lCRC which is typical of most States is demonstrated by the provisions of
Article 81 (1), (2), and (3) of the 1977 Protocol I.
223 The first paragraph of Article 10 refers to "an organization which offers all
guarantees of impartiality and efficacy"; and the third paragraph of that Article
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than the ICRC, which falls within the quoted term, nor does it amplify
that term. However, it is possible to draw certain conclusions with
respect to the nature of the organizations meant to be included within
the term from analogous and collateral material.
Article 88 of the 1929 Convention, which was the direct progenitor
of Article 9 of the 1949 Convention, did not include the possibility of
the intervention of any "humanitarian organization" other than the
ICRC for the purpose of furnishing assistance to prisoners of war.
That possibility received recognition for the first time at the 1949
Diplomatic Conference when a proposal was made by the Italian representative to add the words "or any other impartial humanitarian
body" following the reference to the ICRC in the original draft of what
became Article 9.224 It was adopted by the Joint Committee of the
Diplomatic Conference after a debate in which the representative of
the United States had supported the use for humanitarian purposes
of "welfare organizations of a non-international character" and the
Committee had rejected a Burmese proposal to narrow the Italian
proposal to "any other internationally recognized impartial humanitarian body."225 It was approved at a Plenary Meeting of the Diplomatic Conference without debate. 226
The foregoing is the substance of the legislative history concerning the addition of the words "or any other impartial humanitarian
organization" to Article 9 of the 1949 Convention.227 There are clearly
three basic requirements before an organization can claim to come
within the meaning of the Article: first, it must be impartial in its
operations; second, it must be humanitarian in concept and function;
and third, it must have some institutional, operational, and functional
resemblance to the lCRC. Negatively, it need not be international in
creation and it need not be neutral in origin. 228
refers to "a humanitarian organization such as the ICRC." From the context it
would appear that the draftsmen intended that an organization would have the
same qualifications in any of the three situations, even though different words were
used and different goals were sought. Article 81 (4) of the 1977 Protocol I refers to
"the other humanitarian organizations referred to in the Conventions and this Protocol!' Article 5(4) of the Protocol adopts the language of the first paragraph of
Article 10 of the 1949 Convention quoted above.
224 2B Final Record 21.
225 Ibid., 60 (emphasis added).
226 Ibid., 346.
221 At some point in the deliberations the word "body" was changed to "organization," but this author was unable to pinpoint the eVent-a result not unique to
this particular matter.
228 For a discussion in depth of this problem, see Levie, Repatriation 697-701.
The organization referred to in note 58 supra would probably qualify. This author
has strong reservations concerning both the "impartiality" and the "efficacy" of
any alleged humanitarian organization with political parentage, such as one that
is a creature of the United Nations. See pp. 18-19 supra.
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Assuming, as we have, that the humanitarian organizations mentioned in Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention were intended to have
identical qualifications, and that the ICRe serves as the prototype for
"an impartial humanitarian organization," much that has been said
with respect to the leRe would, in an appropriate case, be applicable
to any organization authorized by one or more of the belligerents to
function under either of those articles. 229 Notable exceptions to the
foregoing statement are to be found in the first paragraph of Article
123 which refers only to the leRe in authorizing the proposal of the
creation of a Central Prisoners of War Information Agency; the fourth
paragraph of Article 123 which refers to the humanitarian activities
of the leRe "or of the relief societies provided for in Article 125";
and the last paragraph of Article 126 which very pointedly assigns
only to the leRe and its delegates the prerogatives enjoyed by the
Protecting Power of visiting prisoner-of-war installations and interviewing prisoners of war privately, with no mention whatsoever of
any other organization of any kind. 230 All in all, it may be said that
while other humanitarian organizations recognized by one or more
of the belligerents are accorded many of the privileges which the eonvention accords to the leRe, the latter still occupies a very special
position insofar as assistance to prisoners of war is concerned. 231
229 While various terms are used to designate the other humanitarian organizations (see, for example, the third paragraphs of Articles 72 and 73, the first
'paragraph and subparagraph (b) of Article 75, and the first paragraph of Article
79), the import of many of the provisions of the Convention, with the exceptions
noted in the text, is that what the ICRC may do, another humanitarian organization may do, if it has been approved by one or more of the belligerents.
230 Conversely, the ICRC is not specifically mentioned in the first paragraph of
Article 125, which requires the Detaining Power to provide the representatives of
"religious organizations, relief societies, or any other organization assisting prisoners of war ... with the necessary facilities for visiting the prisoners [of war]."
However, this right of visitation is not for the purpose of inspection or interview,
but solely for the purpose of the distribution of relief supplies and other materials
intended to improve morale; and even here, the third paragraph of Article 125
recognizes the special position of the ICRC in this field. (Of course, an organization designated as a substitute for a Protecting Power under the provisions of
the three paragraphs of Article 19 would enjoy the prerogatives of visitation and
interview under the provisions of the first two paragraphs of Article 126.)
231 See Article 5 (3) and (4) of the 1977 Protocol I.

